The Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect on Judicial Independence by Green, Matthew W., Jr. et al.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2012
The Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect
on Judicial Independence
Matthew W. Green Jr.
Cleveland State University, m.w.green@csuohio.edu
Susan J. Becker
Cleveland State University, s.becker@csuohio.edu
Marsha K. Ternus
Camilla B. Taylor
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Judges Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law
Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew W. Green Jr., Susan J. Becker, Marsha K. Ternus, and Camilla B. Taylor, The Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect on
Judicial Independence, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461 (2012)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/6
 
 
461 
THE POLITICIZATION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
AND ITS EFFECT ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE∗ 
MATTHEW W. GREEN JR., SUSAN J. BECKER, HON. MARSHA K. TERNUS,  
CAMILLA B. TAYLOR, AND DANIEL P. TOKAJI 
 I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND LGBT RIGHTS:  
  AN UNEASY MARRIAGE 
  MATTHEW W. GREEN JR. .................................................... 462 
A. Introduction ................................................................. 462 
B.   Judicial Independence ................................................. 464 
C.   Marriage Equality ....................................................... 465 
 II. AN OVERVIEW OF LGBT EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL  
  INDEPENDENCE 
  SUSAN J. BECKER ................................................................ 466 
A  Introduction ................................................................ 466 
1. Brief History of the LGBT Equality Movement .. 466 
2. Current Status of LGBT Equality in the  
  United States ......................................................... 468 
3.   California’s Marriage Wars .................................. 468 
4.   Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions in Other States ... 469 
B.   Judicial Independence Overview ................................. 470 
1.   Definition and Virtues of Judicial  
 Independence ........................................................ 470 
2.   The Formalism-Realism Debate ........................... 471 
C.   Inherent Impediments to Judicial Independence ......... 472 
1.   Choosing the Applicable Law .............................. 472 
2.   Intentional Vagueness of Legal Rules and  
 Standards .............................................................. 472 
3.   Necessity of Factual Resolution ........................... 473 
4.   Re-framing of Issues on Appeal ........................... 474 
5.   Judges are Human ................................................ 476 
D.   Final Thoughts on Judicial Independence ................... 478 
 III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PERIL? 
  HON. MARSHA K. TERNUS ................................................... 479 
A.   Introduction ................................................................. 479 
B.   Independent Judiciary ................................................. 479 
 
                                                           
 ∗ The Symposium took place on October 21, 2011 and was part of the “Transformative 
Dialogue Series” at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
462 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:461 
C.   Rule of Law .................................................................. 480 
D.   Varnum Decision ......................................................... 481 
E.   The Retention Election ................................................. 481 
F.   Threat to an Independent Judiciary............................. 484 
G.   Conclusion ................................................................... 488 
 IV. BULLYING THE BENCH 
  CAMILLA B. TAYLOR ........................................................... 489 
A.   Reaction to Varnum v. Brien ....................................... 490 
B.   Civil Rights Decisions in Iowa .................................... 492 
C.   Iowa Allows Same-Sex Marriage ................................ 493 
D.   The Justices of the Varnum Court ............................... 494 
E.   Reaction ....................................................................... 494 
 V.   A TOXIC BREW: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE AGE OF  
  BIG-MONEY POLITICS 
  DANIEL P. TOKAJI ................................................................ 497 
A.   Introduction ................................................................. 497 
B.   History ......................................................................... 498 
C.   Iowa ............................................................................. 499 
D.   Megatrends .................................................................. 500 
E.   Effects .......................................................................... 503 
F.   Conclusion ................................................................... 505 
 
I.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND LGBT RIGHTS: AN UNEASY MARRIAGE  
MATTHEW W. GREEN JR.∗ 
A.  Introduction 
Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today for our conference on the 
Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect on Judicial Independence and 
LGBT Rights.  I thought that I would briefly explain the idea behind today’s 
program and some of the issues that our panelists will be addressing before turning 
the program over to them.  As the program title suggests, today’s program marries 
                                                           
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University, 
Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, Magna Cum Laude; 
B.A., University of Maryland, College Park; law clerk to the Hon. Eric L. Clay, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2001-2002 and the Hon. Deborah K. Chasanow, U.S. District 
Court for the District of Maryland, 2000-2001.  We would like to extend a special thanks to 
the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for providing the financial support that made this program 
possible.  In addition, we extend a very special thank you to the cosponsors of this event: the 
Cleveland-Marshall Allies; the Ohio American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the American 
Constitution Society (ACS) Northeast Ohio Chapter; and the Cleveland State University’s 
Office of Diversity and Multicultural Affairs.   
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two themes—judicial independence and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgendered (“LGBT”) individuals, who often turn to the courts to protect their 
civil rights.  This conference will explore the importance of an independent judiciary 
to the hot-button issue of same-sex marriage or marriage equality.   
The idea for this conference stemmed from the November 2010 Iowa judicial 
election, in which three justices were voted out of office as a result of joining a 
unanimous ruling, Varnum v. Brien, that struck down, on equal protection grounds, a 
state statute limiting marriage rights to heterosexual couples.1  That decision 
spawned a backlash, including a huge influx of money from out-of-state special 
interest groups used to urge voters to oust the judges based on their decision in 
Varnum.  What was remarkable about Iowa is that for the first time since Iowa 
adopted its current system of electing judges, sitting Supreme Court justices were 
voted out of office and, undisputedly, were voted out of office because of a judicial 
ruling.2   
Some who called for the ouster justified it by contending that the election sent a 
message that power resides with the people—presumably of Iowa—and not with the 
courts, and by claiming that the ouster was warranted as Varnum was the product of 
activist judges.  It is not clear, however, that such assertions withstand scrutiny.  To 
the extent the ouster was intended to demonstrate the power of the people, one 
wonders what “people” are being referenced?  The campaign to unseat the justices 
was financed heavily by non-Iowan interest groups, including the Washington D.C.-
based Citizens United and Family Research Council (“FRC”); the New Jersey-based 
National Organization for Marriage (“NOM”); and the Mississippi-based American 
Family Association (“AFA”).3  NOM and AFA, alone, reportedly contributed around 
seven hundred thousand of the nearly million dollars that was spent on the campaign 
to oust the justices.4  A quick Google search demonstrates that several of these 
groups are vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage and other legal protections for 
LGBT individuals.  The organizations waged a highly visible non-retention 
campaign.  FRC, for instance, sponsored a twenty city bus tour and NOM spent 
more than four hundred thousand dollars for TV advertisements urging voters to oust 
the justices.5  It takes no great leap of logic to conclude that these groups were 
voicing their own anti-LGBT message in Iowa as they had done in other states.  To 
be sure, the anti-marriage equality message resonated with a segment of Iowa voters.  
It is also clear, however, that the “power” evidenced by the judicial ouster was 
wielded to a large degree by well-funded, out-of-state interest groups whose voices 
were loudly heard in Iowa and elsewhere.    
                                                           
 1 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 2 See TODD E. PETTYS, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (2011). 
 3 See id. at 728. 
 4 See id.  
 5 See Andy Kopsa, National Anti-Gay Groups Unite to Target Iowa Judges, IOWA 
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://iowaindependent.com/45701/national-anti-
gay-groups-unite-to-target-iowa-judges.  See also Andy Kopsa, Anti-retention Leaders: Iowa 
Just the Start of National Gay Marriage Battle, IOWA INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 2010, available 
at http://iowaindependent.com/46519/anti-retention-leaders-iowa-just-the-start-of-gay-marriag 
e-battle.  
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More baffling is the charge that Varnum was the product of activist (presumably 
liberal) judges.  As noted earlier, the decision was unanimous.  Judges appointed to 
the bench by both political parties joined the opinion.  Indeed, two of the justices 
voted out of office were appointed by Democratic governors and the third, one of our 
panelists and honored guests this afternoon, former Chief Justice Marsha K. Ternus, 
was appointed by a Republican governor.  More importantly, it is not clear whether 
anyone who has actually read the Varnum opinion would call it a product of 
activists.  Professor Todd Pettys has remarked that what makes the Iowa experience 
so problematic is that, no matter what one’s political preferences might be on the 
issue of same-sex marriage, one who reads Varnum will find that the court’s 
reasoning fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional 
analysis.  As Professor Pettys aptly states, “[t]he three justices did not lose their jobs 
by violating widely embraced conventions of constitutional reasoning[; r]ather they 
lost their jobs by reaching a conclusion that many citizens found morally and 
politically objectionable.”6    
Accepting Professor Pettys’ position regarding the settled constitutional analysis 
at work in Varnum, then at bottom, sitting justices were voted off the bench not for 
being activists, but for deciding a case based on the facts and the law and by 
employing reasoning that fell within the scope of accepted equal protection analysis.  
That unprecedented occurrence sparked the idea for this conference.  The conference 
addresses, among other things, whether the backlash that occurred in Iowa after the 
Varnum decision might undermine judicial independence in jurisdictions where 
judges are elected.    
B.  Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence has been defined in numerous ways, and our panelists will 
explore some of the ways in which the term has been defined.  But one way in which 
judicial independence has been defined is as a condition in which judges are free 
from negative political consequences, such as being voted out of office, as a result of 
decisions made from the bench.7  Judges, of course, take an oath of office to uphold 
the constitution and uphold the rule of law without respect of person.  In rendering a 
decision on a hot-button issue, however, it is unquestionably difficult to ignore the 
political consequences of that decision, particularly when those consequences might 
mean a campaign to unseat you.  Former California Supreme Court justice Otto Kaus 
put the threat of negative political consequences on judicial independence this way: 
“‘There’s no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of 
certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time.  That 
would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.’”8 
Many states, including Ohio, use some form of elections to select and to retain 
judges, although the types of elections often differ from state to state.  Since the 
early 1960s, for instance, Iowa has used a merit-selection and retention system to 
                                                           
 6 PETTYS, supra note 2, at 717. 
 7 See LAWRENCE BAUM, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s 
Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 14 (2003). 
 8 Id. at 39 n.113 (quoting Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, 
at 52, 58). 
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select and retain its Supreme Court justices.9  After an initial appointment to the 
bench, the justices retain their seats by running unopposed in periodic elections.  To 
remain on the bench they must receive a vote of at least 50 percent of all votes cast.  
It is commonly assumed that judges should be least vulnerable to political pressure 
under a system that uses retention elections as, among other things, judges run 
unopposed and have little obvious need to campaign or raise funds.10  Yet, as more 
and more money from interest groups pours into judicial elections of all kinds in an 
effort to influence the outcome of the election, one wonders whether that assumption 
is correct or will remain so in the future?  Moreover, if interest groups are 
increasingly successful in their efforts to unseat judges, as they were in Iowa, what 
effect might that have in other states where judges are elected and are also 
adjudicating hot-button issues?   
We are fortunate to have with us today Daniel Takoji, professor of law at the 
Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, who will discuss, among other 
things, the role of money in judicial elections and more broadly its effect on judicial 
independence. 
C.  Marriage Equality 
Despite the breadth of issues that might galvanize special interests to funnel 
money into judicial elections to unseat judges who vote “the wrong way,” this 
conference takes a look at the potential effect of the Iowa ouster on judicial 
independence through the prism of same-sex marriage, which remains a hot-button 
social issue, and of course was the issue the court dealt with in Varnum.  Minorities, 
including LGBT individuals—like the plaintiffs in Varnum—often have resorted to 
the courts to vindicate their civil rights under federal and state law.  We focus here 
on the effect that the Iowa ouster might have on efforts to advance LGBT rights in 
state courts where judges are often elected.  Currently, a majority of states use some 
form of election system to select and/or to retain judges.  
Some have argued that marriage equality is the civil rights issue of the day.  If 
that is so, it stands to reason that LGBT individuals would turn to the courts to 
protect their legal rights as other minority groups traditionally have done.  
Considering what occurred in Iowa, however, might courts be inclined to rule a 
particular way on marriage equality or LGBT rights more broadly considering the 
political consequences of doing otherwise?  What other factors, if any, might affect 
judges grappling with LGBT-rights issues?   
 
D.  Symposium Structure 
 
The panelists will address the issues I’ve raised and others pertaining to judicial 
independence and LGBT rights.  Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Professor 
Susan Becker will begin the discussion.  After providing a thoughtful overview of 
the struggle for LGBT rights, she will discuss various factors that likely have 
influenced and will continue to influence judicial independence when addressing 
LGBT rights.  We also are fortunate to have with us today Camilla Taylor, of 
                                                           
 9 See PETTYS, supra note 2, at 716.  See also Hallie Sears, Note, A New Approach to 
Judicial Retention: Where Expertise Meets Democracy, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 871, 871-72 
(2011). 
 10 See Sears, supra note 9, at 875. 
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Lambda Legal, who successfully litigated the Varnum decision through the Iowa 
courts, and who will discuss her efforts in Iowa prior to litigating the Varnum case 
and we expect will address whether the backlash that occurred after Varnum might 
affect Lambda’s efforts to challenge laws affecting LGBT rights in other states 
where judges are elected.   
After hearing from Professors Becker and Takoji and Ms. Taylor, we’ll hear 
remarks from the Hon. Marsha K. Ternus, who we are extremely honored to have 
with us today.  Justice Ternus was caught in the maelstrom that occurred in Iowa 
after the court’s decision in Varnum.  She will recount her experience and offer her 
unique perspective on whether politicized judicial elections might undermine judicial 
independence.   
I’ll begin things with a brief question: Might politicized judicial elections 
negatively affect judicial independence and LGBT rights?  Taking Justice Kaus’ 
views on the matter at face value, one might respond with “it might, but I hope it 
does not.”  We look forward to exploring this issue today and to a provocative 
discussion. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF LGBT EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
SUSAN J. BECKER∗ 
A.  Introduction 
Today’s program is part of the “transformative dialogue” series offered at the 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law this academic year.  I have the honor of 
commencing the dialogue by providing background information on two topics: first, 
the current status of the LGBT rights movement with primary focus on marriage 
equality, and second, the role that judicial independence—or perhaps the lack 
thereof—has played in advancing and impeding this civil rights movement. 
1.  Brief History of the LGBT Equality Movement 
We cannot fully comprehend the current legal landscape as experienced by 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons without a brief glance in the 
rear view mirror.  Although the 1969 riots at the Stonewall Inn in New York City are 
often cited as the birth of the LGBT civil rights movement in this country, its origins 
can be traced much further back.   
More than four decades before Stonewall, a young Army veteran named Henry 
Gerber incorporated The Society for Human Rights in Illinois.  The Society is 
generally acknowledged as the first gay rights organization in the United States.11  
Shortly after the Society was founded in 1924, Gerber and several other members 
                                                           
 ∗ Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.  
Professor Becker’s areas of teaching and scholarship include Sexual Orientation and the Law, 
and she maintains a modest pro bono practice focusing primarily on legal issues presented by 
LGBT clients.  Professor Becker also serves as Board President for the ACLU of Ohio, a co-
sponsor of this conference.   
 11 JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A.: 
A DOCUMENTARY 386-87 (1976); STEVE HOGAN & LEE HUDSON, COMPLETELY QUEER: THE 
GAY AND LESBIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 244 (1998). 
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were arrested and charged with deviancy.  After three trials, Gerber was acquitted.12  
He then reenlisted in the Army and served his country for an additional seventeen 
years.13   
In the 1950s, courageous souls such as Phyllis Lyons and Del Martin formed the 
Daughters of Bilitis14 in San Francisco while Harry Hay and others founded the 
Mattachine Society in Los Angeles.15  One of the most amazing aspects of these and 
other early advocacy groups is that they flourished even while the rabidly anti-gay 
clouds of McCarthyism cast dark shadows over the land.  Nonetheless, LGBT rights 
pioneers fought for the repeal of discriminatory laws and policies and for the 
recognition of lesbians and gay men as healthy and productive members of society.    
The challenges faced by these trailblazers were daunting.  Historically, the law in 
this country has not looked favorably upon LGBT citizens.  In its most benign form, 
the law simply pretended that the United States was populated exclusively with 
heterosexual persons, thus finding no reason to recognize constitutional or other 
rights of non-heterosexuals.  In its harshest form, the law penalized and punished 
anyone who dared stray from the classic heterosexual paradigm, including 
transgender or transsexual persons who challenged the conventional binary view of 
gender as either exclusively masculine or feminine.  
As a result, LGBT parents were routinely denied custody and visitation of their 
children.  LGBT employees terminated from employment due to their sexual 
orientation or gender identity had no legal recourse for wrongful termination.  Same-
sex couples who had been in committed relationships for decades were, in the eyes 
of the law, complete strangers to one another.  Adults engaging in intimate, 
consensual, same-sex sexual conduct could be criminally prosecuted under state 
sodomy laws.        
The work of Lyons, Martin, Hay, and other early advocates ultimately led to the 
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to no longer define homosexuality as a 
mental illness,16 the repeal of many state sodomy laws, and a gradual shift in this 
country’s collective consciousness about gender identity and sexual orientation.  
Successive generations of advocates built on these achievements to create the 
modern socio-political-legal environment for LGBT citizens.   
Consequently, the modern legal landscape for LGBT citizens is very different 
than the one encountered by Gerber and his colleagues more than eight decades ago.  
Nonetheless, the legal rights and recognition of LGBT persons in the U.S. today are 
largely dependent on geography.  States in the Northeast and the West Coast provide 
the greatest rights, while Southern states have proven the least receptive to LGBT 
equality.  
                                                           
 12 Henry Gerber, CHICAGO GAY AND LESBIAN HALL OF FAME, 
http://www.glhalloffame.org/ index.pl?item=18&todo=view_item (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 13 Id. 
 14 KAY TOBIN & RANDY WICKER, THE GAY CRUSADERS 50 (1975). 
 15 CHARLES KAISER, THE GAY METROPOLIS: 1940-1996, at 122-23 (1997). 
 16 Id. at 123-24, 235-40.    
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2.  Current Status of LGBT Equality in the United States 
Legal recognition of same-sex relationships both illustrates the geographic 
divides in this country and serves as a barometer for both how far the LGBT equality 
movement has come and how far it has to go.  
As of January 2012,17 six states and the District of Columbia (as of 2010) allow 
same sex couples to wed.  The states and the year that this major milestone was 
achieved are Massachusetts (2004), Connecticut (2008), Iowa (2009), Vermont 
(2009), New Hampshire (2010), and New York (2011).  
Nine states offer state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples that are equivalent 
to marriage rights.  These are California (domestic partnerships, effective in 1999, 
expanded in 2005), Delaware (civil unions, effective 2012), Hawaii (civil unions, 
effective 2012), Illinois (civil unions, 2011) Nevada (domestic partnerships, 2009), 
New Jersey (civil unions, 2007), Oregon (domestic partnerships, 2008), Rhode 
Island (civil unions, 2011), and Washington (domestic partnerships, established 
2007, expanded in 2009).  Colorado (2009), Maine (2004) and Wisconsin (2009) 
offer selective spousal rights to same-sex couples.  
The ongoing fight for LGBT relationship recognition repeatedly teaches the 
lesson that achieving a civil rights victory comes with no guarantee of retaining 
those rights.  California provides a classic case study.  Although it may seem hard to 
believe, the following presentation is actually an abridged version of California’s 
history related to same-sex marriage. 
3.  California’s Marriage Wars 
California established limited domestic partner benefits in 1999. In 2002, 
however, California voters approved Proposition 22, the California Defense of 
Marriage Act, or California “DOMA.” Proposition 22 amended California’s family 
law statute to clarify that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”18 
In February 2004, the mayor of San Francisco directed officials to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.  Within a month, the California Supreme Court 
declared that San Francisco did not have the power to issue marriage licenses that 
were not authorized by state statute.19  The court did not, however, address the issue 
of whether the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage (i.e. the law established by 
Proposition 22) violated the state’s constitution.  San Francisco and other parties 
then initiated state court actions challenging California’s exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage.  These state constitutional challenges were consolidated for 
trial. 
In 2005, the trial court held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
violated California’s equal protection guarantees.20  The California legislature also 
                                                           
 17 The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) website contains extensive information about the 
current status of LGBT equality in marriage and other forms of relationship recognition, 
adoption, employment and other areas of the law.  See http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry 
/maps-of-state-laws-policies.   
 18 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5. 
 19 Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
 20 In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129, at *1, *2 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
March 14, 2005). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/6
2012] THE POLITICIZATION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 469 
significantly expanded domestic partner rights for same-sex couples that year.  A 
California intermediate appeals court then reversed the trial court in a 2-1 decision, 
again invalidating same-sex marriage.  
In May 2008, the California Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision 
striking down California’s Defense of Marriage Act, concluding in a 4-3 decision 
that same-sex marriage must be recognized under the state constitution.21  
Approximately eighteen thousand same-sex couples then married in California.  
Backlash to the California Supreme Court’s decision was immediate and fierce.   
With significant monetary and other support from out-of-state backers, a referendum 
known as Proposition 8 was placed on California’s November 2008 ballot.  Its 
passage amended the California constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage.  
The California Supreme Court rejected the writ of mandamus filed by 
Proposition 8 opponents who complained that the initiative process used to amend 
the constitution violated the state constitution.22  However, the court left intact the 
eighteen thousand same-sex marriages that occurred in California between the 
California Supreme Court’s decision allowing same-sex marriage and the passage of 
Proposition 8 negating the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
Proposition 8’s amendment to California’s constitution was then challenged in 
federal court by six same-sex couples who alleged that the state’s denial of their 
right to marry violated their federal constitutional rights to equal protection and 
substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  A federal district 
court agreed with the plaintiffs and invalidated California’s constitutional 
amendment in 2010.23  That decision is currently being reviewed by the Ninth 
Circuit.  The federal constitutional issues presented by this case are expected to 
ultimately be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
4.  Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions in Other States 
A U.S. Supreme Court decision clarifying the impact of the federal constitution 
on state marriage laws would have far reaching impact, as twenty-eight states in 
addition to California have state constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex 
marriage, and twelve additional states have legislation limiting marriage to one man 
and one woman.24  Some of the state constitutional amendments prohibit much more 
than just same-sex marriage.  The Ohio amendment is a case in point. 
Ohio was one of twelve states that amended its constitution to prohibit same-sex 
marriage via a ballot initiative approved by voters in November 2004.25  The Ohio 
                                                           
 21 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), reh’g denied 2008 Cal. LEXIS 
6807 (Cal. June 4, 2008).  The court’s 79-page opinion concluded that the California 
Constitution’s guarantees of liberty and personal autonomy include the fundamental right to 
form a family relationship, that sexual orientation discrimination affects a suspect class 
requiring heightened scrutiny, and that denying marriage licenses to same sex couples violates 
their state constitutional equal protection rights. 
 22 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). 
 23 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 24 See Human Rights Campaign, Maps of State Laws & Policies: Statewide Marriage 
Prohibition Laws (2010), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies.pdf.   
 25 Other states enacting constitutional same sex marriage bans in 2004 were Arkansas, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, 
 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
470 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:461 
amendment was unnecessary, as state law already limited marriage to a man and a 
woman.  In addition, there was zero probability that the conservative justices on the 
Supreme Court of Ohio would interpret the state constitution to invalidate that law.  
Nonetheless, voters overwhelming approved the addition of this language to Ohio’s 
constitution: 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid 
in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.  This state and 
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.26 
The full impact of such broad bans is being litigated in state courts in Ohio and 
elsewhere.  A number of pending federal cases also challenge the constitutionality of 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),27 the legislation passed by Congress 
in 1996 to prohibit the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages.  
DOMA also empowers states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages deemed 
legal in their sister states.  The role of the judiciary in advancing or limiting the 
movement towards LGBT equality has perhaps never been more obvious than in the 
courts’ past and future considerations of federal constitutional challenges to state and 
federal DOMAs.   
B.  Judicial Independence Overview 
There is no doubt that state and federal legislators and other elected government 
officials have played a major role in the advancement of LGBT equality.  Recent 
examples include Congress’s repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy 
to allow gay and lesbian service members to be open about their sexual orientation, 
the enactment by more than twenty-one state legislatures of laws prohibiting 
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the New York 
legislature’s approval of same-sex marriage.  Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
overstate the critical role that judges have played in both extending and in limiting 
legal rights and recognition to LGBT persons and their families.  
The specific role that judicial independence—or perhaps the lack thereof—has 
played in these decisions remains unclear.  Any assessment of the role of judicial 
independence in cases involving LGBT parties necessarily requires establishing a 
common understanding of the term “judicial independence.”   
1.  Definition and Virtues of Judicial Independence 
Vast literature on the subject offers many definitions, but all of them share this 
commonality: Judicial independence requires a judge to apply the established “rule 
of law” to the specific facts of the case in a neutral and unbiased manner.  This 
produces a decision that is fair, just, largely predictable, and impartial.  
More specifically, judicial independence demands that judicial decision-making 
be free from extraneous influences such as the judge’s personal interests, political 
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same-sex marriage.  Id.  
 26 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
 27 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
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ideology, religious beliefs, desire to please special interest groups and campaign 
donors, financial considerations, and fear of retaliation for unpopular decisions.  The 
eradication of such extraneous forces results in judicial decisions that serve the best 
interests of the litigants and of society.  
Judicial independence is especially important in a democracy where the will of 
the majority can suppress minority views and rights.  In drafting his famous essays 
intended to convince New York and other colonies to adopt the federal Constitution, 
Alexander Hamilton extolled the virtue of lifetime appointments of federal judges as 
the most effective means of assuring judicial independence.  Hamilton cited 
“complete independence of the courts of justice” as critical to protecting citizens’ 
Constitutional rights, especially when the majority that holds sway in Congress 
enacts legislation harming the rights of the minorities.28 
Of course judicial independence is not a uniquely American concept.  It is a 
widely embraced tenet of international law.  The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, for example, proclaims that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of 
his rights and obligations . . . .”29 
2.  The Formalism-Realism Debate 
A clear definition and pervasive conviction of the virtue of judicial independence 
does not mean, however, that judicial independence is easily achieved, or even 
capable of measuring or monitoring.  Indeed, one of the most frequently debated 
issues here and around the world is whether judicial independence is a desirable 
aspiration rather than an attainable objective.  This debate has historically been 
framed by the “formalism” and “realism” schools of thought.  
Formalists posit that judges are capable of applying the rule of law to any given 
set of facts in a somewhat detached and mechanical manner, thus rendering a truly 
independent—and of course just—decision.30  Realists counter that judges are 
political actors whose decisions are universally and inevitably informed by 
extraneous considerations and biases.31  As is often the cases with opposing schools 
of thought, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.32 
Extensive empirical studies of judicial decisions conducted primarily by political 
scientists yields support for an “attitudinal” model of judicial decision making in 
which jurists’ individual characteristics and world views greatly influence case 
outcomes.33  These studies tend to offer support for the realism rather than formalism 
                                                           
 28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 508-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Meade Earl ed., 
1937). 
 29 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. X (1948). 
 30 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (describing formalist 
American thought).  See also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
 31 See FRANK, supra note 30; Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). 
 32 The middle ground between formalism and realism is thoughtfully negotiated in BRIAN 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 3 (2010). 
 33 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWAKI, 
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 147 (2006). 
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theory.  As is the case with all empirical studies, however, these data and 
conclusions drawn from them are subject to calculation error, researcher biases, and 
other fundamental flaws.  In short, it is not entirely clear whether the judicial biases 
that researchers commonly find are grounded at least in part in the researchers’ own 
biases.      
C.  Inherent Impediments to Judicial Independence 
My review of the extensive literature on the topic of judicial independence, as 
well as my own experience as both an academic and practitioner, inform my view 
that there are at least five major impediments inherent in our justice system that 
thwart even the best intentioned judges’ efforts to achieve true independence in their 
decision-making processes. 
1.  Choosing the Applicable Law 
The first obstacle to independently applying the “rule of law” is that the 
applicable rule is not always obvious.  Judges often must select the determinative 
legal authority from a universe of potential complementary and sometimes 
conflicting rules of law.  Once the most appropriate rule is selected, the judge must 
interpret and apply that law in a manner that conforms as closely as possible to 
precedent.  But “following precedent” is challenging, if not impossible, when the 
rule is invoked to resolve a novel situation.  
This dilemma is a recurring issue in cases involving LGBT litigants, especially 
when those litigants seek extension of state or federal constitutional rights routinely 
afforded heterosexual citizens.  What do intrinsically ill-defined constitutional terms 
such as “liberty,” “due process,” and “equal protection” encompass on an abstract 
basis?  And how do constitutional guarantees grounded in this language apply to 
citizens whose group identity was nonexistent at the time the constitutions were 
drafted?34   
If judges decide that fundamental rights do not apply to LGBT persons, then their 
decisions empower state and federal governments to enact laws and policies that 
disenfranchise a discrete minority.  This is precisely what Alexander Hamilton and 
other founders promised the constitution would not tolerate.  If judges extend 
fundamental rights to LGBT litigants, they must endure the wrath of critics who 
claim that judges are rewriting state and federal constitutions instead of interpreting 
them.  Clearly the decisions judges make extending or denying rights to LGBT 
people must be influenced by something other than the existing, ill-fitting and vague 
rules of law.         
2.  Intentional Vagueness of Legal Rules and Standards 
The second obstacle is that even when the choice of applicable rule is clear, it 
may be intentionally vague.  For example, judges whose dockets consist of child 
                                                           
 34 For a discussion of the development of the legal and social identify of LGBT persons, 
see Susan J. Becker, Many are Chilled but Few are Frozen: How Transformative Learning in 
Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science will Lead to the Eventual Demise of Legally 
Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United States, 14 AM. U. J. 
GENDER & LAW 177, 193-200 (2006); Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a “Homosexual” For 
Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and 
British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529 (1996). 
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custody, visitation, and adoption matters must render decisions that are “in the best 
interests of the child.”35  This standard is borne of necessity, as judges must consider 
myriad factors and navigate often-conflicting factual and expert evidence to arrive at 
a decision that best protects the children’s health and general welfare. 
Well into the 1980s, many state courts embraced a per se rule that exposure to a 
gay or lesbian parent harmed a child.36  Courts have rejected this harsh rule, 
replacing it with the “best interest of the child” standard that had long applied to 
heterosexual parents.37  This change has been heralded as a major victory for LGBT 
persons, and rightly so.  But one must not lose sight of the fact that judges applying 
this “enlightened” standard still retain tremendous discretion to determine a child’s 
(and parent’s) fate.38   
Stated more bluntly, a judge who believes that homosexual parents pose a per se 
harm to their children can conceal that bias through a series of credibility and other 
evidentiary decisions required by the “best interest” rubric.  In a classic “death by a 
thousand paper cuts” scenario, these rulings may unfairly demean the LBGT parent’s 
childrearing skills while greatly exaggerating the skills of the heterosexual parent or 
other relative seeking exclusive or primary parental rights to the child.  Such beliefs 
may also blind a judge to the value of the relationship between a non-biological 
parent and a child that parent has raised with his or her same-sex partner for years.  
Such a result is legally defensible under the “best interest” standard despite its true 
grounding in the judge’s personal bias.         
3.  Necessity of Factual Resolution 
Judges are rarely presented with litigants who agree on the critical facts of a case.  
To the contrary, disputes are often litigated because the litigants have drastically 
disparate conceptions of reality.  And, of course, the identification of the relevant 
                                                           
 35 Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have Parental Rights: A 
Five-Factor Typology, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 72, 77 (2011) (observing that courts typically “rely 
on a ‘best interest of the child’ standard when deciding cases including adoption, custody, and 
visitation”). 
 36 Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Parents with Children: 
Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52:3 J. SOC. ISSUES 29, 33-34 (1996). 
 37 Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet 
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 
459, 472 (1990) (relating that child and visitation cases including those involving lesbian 
parents are decided under the “best interest of the child” standard).  See also Miller, supra 
note 35, at 77; Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child 
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 337 (2008) (concluding that 
the ubiquitous best interest of the child doctrine “is heralded because it espouses the best and 
highest standard; . . . derided because it is necessarily subjective; and . . . relied upon because 
there is nothing better.”). 
 38 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Family 
Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 119-20 (2011) (noting the “inherently 
subjective nature of the test, which may lead to bias,” and further observing that the best 
interest standard “is purposefully broad and amorphous to ensure flexibility in application”) 
(citations omitted); Kohm, supra note 37, at 339 (stating that the best interest standard “has 
turned toward near pure judicial discretion in contemporary judging, causing litigators and 
advocates to have no rule of law to rely upon”). 
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facts of the case has a dramatic impact on both the identification of the legal 
authorities that apply, discussed immediately above, and the proper framing of the 
issue, discussed immediately below.  Because family law cases are often tried to 
judges rather than juries, the inherent challenge in divining the facts to which the law 
applies is especially critical in cases involving recognition of familial relationships 
among LGBT persons and their children.39 
The challenge of determining who did (or did not do) something and when they 
did (or did not do) it is perhaps best illustrated by television broadcasts of U.S. 
football games.  A wide receiver catches the ball and runs fifty yards down the 
sidelines to the end zone.  Five or six television cameras are trained on the runner, 
recording every stride.  The referee signals a touchdown.  But wait . . .  the opposing 
coach is challenging the call, arguing that the runner stepped out of bounds at the 
twenty-yard line, negating the touchdown.  
Even with the aid of the multiple cameras recording reality as it unfolded, replay 
officials often determine that such video evidence is “inconclusive” as to whether the 
player was out of bounds.  If reality cannot be ascertained despite multiple, 
simultaneous video recordings of an event, how likely is it that a judge can 
accurately reconstruct the facts of a case from the bits and pieces of evidence 
presented in motions, during hearings, and at trial?  
Unlike a football referee, a judge does not have the luxury of finding that the 
evidence presented is “inconclusive.”  The judge must evaluate each piece of 
evidence to assess its admissibility and credibility, with each individual decision 
providing a building block of the foundation on which the judge’s decision will 
ultimately rest.    
Once again, the significant discretion vested in judges when evaluating the 
relative trustworthiness of witness testimony and other evidence allows the insidious 
bias of a judge to infiltrate the proceedings in a subtle and pervasive manner.  As 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has observed, “[p]ersonal experiences 
affect the facts that judges choose to see.”40 
And this phenomenon is not only a danger at the trial level.  As Judge Richard 
Posner explained, “Appellate judges in our system often can conceal the role of 
personal preferences in their decisions by stating the facts selectively, so that the 
outcome seems to follow from them inevitably . . . .”41   
4.  Re-framing of Issues on Appeal 
Any experienced litigator, and certainly those who routinely represent LGBT 
clients, has likely handled cases in which dispositive legal issues incurred significant 
reconstruction—or in the common vernacular, “morphed”—throughout the trial and 
appeals process.  Such transformations are both necessary to judicial review and 
dangerous to judicial independence. 
                                                           
 39 See, e.g., Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyoming 1995) (presenting radically 
different factual conclusions by majority and dissenting judges resolving a child visitation 
dispute in which mother’s sexual orientation was at issue). 
 40 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002), 
reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us 
/politics/15judge.text.html. 
 41 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 144 (Harv. Univ. Press 2008). 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/6
2012] THE POLITICIZATION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 475 
Appellate judges often exercise their prerogative to correct the manner in which 
litigants have framed the dispositive issues.  In some instances judges must choose 
between competing versions of the issues presented by the litigants.  This exercise is 
appropriate in situations where, for example, litigants misrepresent the standard of 
review applicable to the issues raised in the appeal.  It is not uncommon, for 
example, for appellants to attempt to invoke heightened de novo review of the trial 
court’s factual findings where the differential abuse of discretion standard is proper.  
It is equally common for appellants to frame challenges to the lower court’s 
evidentiary rulings as being of constitutional magnitude when those decisions are 
also subject to the abuse of discretion standard.    
No one seriously challenges the necessity of a judge’s prerogative to reformulate 
the issues on appeal.  But it must also be conceded that the judge’s exercise of this 
prerogative allows a judge to inject his or her personal views on how the appeal 
should be resolved.  Similar to Judge Posner’s observation about judicial selectivity 
of facts, a judge’s restructuring of legal issues creates the opportunity to dictate the 
inevitability of the outcome.   
This phenomena of issue framing dictating the outcome of the appeal is perhaps 
best illustrated by two U.S. Supreme Court decisions rendered just seventeen years 
apart, a mere blink of an eye in the history of constitutional law: Bowers v. 
Hardwick, decided in 1983, and Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003.  Bowers and 
Lawrence both presented the Court with whether a state law criminalizing 
consensual sexual conduct between two adults of the same sex violates the U.S. 
Constitution.   
As framed in the preceding sentence, the issue presented by Lawrence and 
Bowers seems relatively narrow and straight-forward.  The importance of the Court’s 
answer to this question, however, extended well beyond the enforceability of the 
state “sodomy” statutes at the heart of these cases.  In fact, prosecutions under 
sodomy statutes were quite rare by the time the Court agreed to hear Bowers, and the 
majority of states had repealed their sodomy laws by the time Lawrence was 
considered.  But the very existence of these criminal laws in states that retained them 
proved highly detrimental to LGBT litigants in civil cases.  
For example, in cases where a lesbian mother was fighting for custody or 
visitation with her children or a former employee was challenging termination from 
public employment based solely on his or her sexual orientation, courts routinely 
concluded that the “lifestyle” of the gay or lesbian litigant inevitably violated the 
state’s criminal statutes forbidding sodomy.  Courts had no trouble reaching these 
conclusions despite no evidence in the record as to past or present sexual activities—
if any—in which the litigants engaged.  This inevitable “criminal” behavior, in turn, 
justified the court’s denial of a litigant’s rights to her own children or not to be fired 
from a job.42  In short, the sodomy statutes at the center of the Bowers and Lawrence 
                                                           
 42 See Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Parents with 
Children: Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52:3 J. SOC. ISSUES 29, 33-34 
(1996) (explaining courts’ historic unfavorable view of lesbians parents); Rhonda R. Rivera, 
Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1978-1979) (explaining disadvantageous legal position of LGBT 
persons in family law, employment law and other areas due to perception of homosexuals as 
immoral and socially deviant); Anne T. Payne, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody 
and Parental Rights of Homosexual, Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill and Incarcerated 
Parents, 16 J. FAM. L. 797, 818 (1977-1978) (reporting that courts often deemed homosexuals 
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appeals had implications for LGBT equality far beyond their facial boundaries.  
Removing those boundaries on LGBT people had far reaching societal as well as 
legal ramifications.  
In framing the issues for each case, members of the Court’s majority arguably 
telegraphed their personal biases related to the outcome.  Justice White, writing for 
Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, 
articulated the critical issue in Bowers as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the 
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a 
very long time.”43   
In sharp contrast, Justice Kennedy, writing for Associate Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,44 declared that Lawrence “should be resolved by 
determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”45   
No one was surprised when the Bowers Court answered a resounding “no” to the 
issue it framed, thereby upholding state sodomy statutes, while the Lawrence Court 
answered “yes” to the issue it had framed, declaring such statutes unconstitutional. 
5.  Judges are Human 
In 2001, then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor offered these observations 
about the many factors that influence judicial decision-making: 
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural 
differences, . . . our gender and national origins may and will make a 
difference in our judging. . . . I would hope that a wise Latina woman with 
the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better 
conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.46  
Adding fuel to the firestorm that would ignite during her 2009 Senate confirmation 
hearings for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor 
continued:  
My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate 
them further into areas with which I am unfamiliar.  I simply do not know 
                                                           
per se unfit parents and that even parents imprisoned for committing serious crimes were 
“treated to less spurious moralizing and discrimination” than were gay and lesbian parents). 
 43 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (emphasis added).  Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.  Id. at 199. 
 44 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003).  Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by 
Justices Thomas and Rehnquist.  Id. at 586.  Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in 
the judgment, finding a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation because the Texas 
statute only criminalized certain conduct between same-sex but not opposite-sex partners.  Id. 
at 579.    
 45 Id. at 564 (emphasis added).  
 46 Sotomayor, supra note 40, at 92. 
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exactly what that difference will be in my judging.  But I accept there will 
be some based on my gender and my Latina heritage.47 
While Justice Sotomayor’s comments from 2001 remain controversial, no one 
seriously doubts the veracity of her statements.  To the contrary, it is because those 
statements are true that the concept of judicial independence remains subject to 
debate.  Every person on this planet perceives his environs through a lens formed by 
place and time of birth, cultural heritage, education and work experiences, and 
religious, social, and economic influences to which he or she was exposed—in short, 
by the many factors that simultaneously establish each person as an individual and 
connect them with communal identities.  It is beyond folly to think that merely 
donning a black robe or picking up a gavel causes people to shed all the influences 
that make them who they are.  The judges-are-humans conclusion is confirmed by 
empirical studies as well as common sense.  Studies conducted over decades by 
political scientists consistently find significant links between judges’ individual 
characteristics and the decisions they render.  These data support what is known as 
the “attitudinal model” of decision-making.  
One of the strongest correlations repeatedly identified is the link between the 
judges’ political ideology, that is, his or her position along the conservative-to-
liberal spectrum, and the decisions they render in cases with significant political and 
social overtones, such as cases involving LGBT rights.  Exhibit A for this conclusion 
is the framing of the issues and accompanying issue resolution by the conservative 
judge majority in Bowers compared with the issue framing and resolution by the 
liberate and moderate justices in Lawrence as discussed above.  Exhibit B is the 
significant statistical work done by attorney and social scientist Daniel Pinello. 
Pinello conducted a detailed empirical study of 468 state and federal appellate 
court cases involving LGBT litigants during the 1980s and 1990s.48  Interestingly, 
Pinello found support for and against the conclusion that judicial independence is 
alive and well in those cases.  In support of judicial independence, Pinello found that 
precedent was well respected by trial and intermediate appellate courts.49  In other 
words, these courts tended to follow the rule of law if one existed.  Pinello also 
concluded that the courts paid close attention to the facts of each case.50 
In findings that affirm the attitudinal model of decision-making in cases 
involving LGBT rights, Pinello’s findings include the following:  
• Gender (female)51 and race (minority)52 produced significantly more 
decisions favoring  LGBT litigants; 
                                                           
 47 Id. 
 48 DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 76-93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2003). 
 49 Id. at 79, 82, 150. 
 50 Id. at 79.  It is not clear whether Pinello’s methodology specifically screened for the 
possible judicial selectivity of facts or issue selection, two common threats to judicial 
independence described above.  
 51 Id. at 88. 
 52 Id. at 87. 
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• Religion was statistically significant, with Jewish judges being the most 
favorable to LGBT litigants, Catholic judges least favorable, and 
Protestants in the middle;53   
• Age was important, as younger judges were more likely to render pro-
equality decision; and54 
• Political ideology played a major role, as federal judges appointed by 
Democrats were significantly more receptive to the equality claims of 
LGBT litigants than those appointed by Republicans.55 
I have not been able to locate extensive empirical data on decisions involving LGBT 
litigant since 2000, but based on my familiarity with many federal and state court 
decisions rendered since then I would not predict any radical shifts in these findings. 
D.  Final Thoughts on Judicial Independence 
A final critical issue that we address today is this: How does the public perceive 
this complicated concept of judicial independence, especially in controversial cases 
such as those involving LGBT rights?  After months of reading and thinking about 
judicial independence, I humbly offer the following perspective. 
Judicial independence is widely embraced as a fundamental aspect of our 
democracy.  People who have never heard of the Federalist Papers (or maybe even of 
Alexander Hamilton) understand its import.  But after the general consensus that 
judicial independence is a core value and must be protected, unanimity on the topic 
crumbles.    
The breakdown occurs due in large part to the lack of metrics to accurately 
measure judicial independence in a given case.  As a result, the public’s perception 
of judicial independence has much in common with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
infamous definition of obscenity: “we know it when we see it,” or at least we think 
we do.  
So when we learn of a judicial decision with which we disagree, whether it is a 
landmark LGBT rights case, a decision that declares that corporations are  “citizens,” 
or a case that effectively decides who will be our next president, our first reaction is 
to impugn the integrity and motives of the judge or judges who rendered it.  Any 
decision that offends our political sensibilities and sense of justice results in our 
attaching the dreaded “activist judge” label to its author(s).   
Most people grumble about the decision for a few days and then go on about 
their lives.  Law professors prefer to write scathing law review articles about 
decisions they disfavor, an expenditure of energy that likely has no influence 
whatsoever on the judiciary’s decision-making process or the general public’s view 
of it.  But people who feel especially passionate about the decision may organize in a 
manner that takes the concept of “activism” to a fevered pitch. 
Similar to the fate that befell Hester Prynne of Scarlet Letter fame, political 
strategists use modern media to symbolically attach a large red “A” on the “activist” 
judges’ robes.  They organize referendum campaigns to overturn judicial decisions—
for example, the Proposition 8 referendum in California that reversed the California 
Supreme Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage.  Political strategists 
                                                           
 53 Id. at 88-91. 
 54 Id. at 91. 
 55 Id. at 114-15, 151-52. 
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sometimes directly target the judges as well as their decisions.  This, of course, is 
what happened in Iowa following that court’s decision in Varnum v. Brien 
recognizing same-sex marriage.56  And it is the reason we are here today.  Is this 
political backlash democracy in action that should be encouraged, or does it 
undermine the very concept of judicial independence that it purports to protect?  
I leave resolution of that question to our other speakers today.  Ultimately, 
however, that question will be answered by each of you and by other members of the 
American public, as we individually and collectively decide whether or how to react 
to judicial decisions with which we disagree.   
III.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PERIL? 
HON. MARSHA K. TERNUS 
A.  Introduction 
Good afternoon.  Thank you for asking me to participate in this discussion of 
judicial independence and the impact of the politicization of judicial elections on that 
core value of our society.  These concepts,—judicial independence and the threat 
posed by politicized judicial elections,—may sound like abstract principles, but they 
are not abstract to me.  I have lived them—or should I say, I have survived them.  
As you now know, in the 2010 Iowa judicial retention election, voters removed 
three justices from the Iowa Supreme Court after an unprecedented campaign against 
them, funded by out-of-state special interest groups.  The primary impetus for the 
campaign against the justices was the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision 
nineteen months earlier in Varnum v. Brien, declaring Iowa’s defense of marriage act 
violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under the Iowa Constitution.57    
B.  Independent Judiciary 
The events in Iowa provide a concrete context for our discussion of judicial 
independence and the peril posed by politicized judicial elections.  So this afternoon, 
I would like to talk about the Varnum decision and its aftermath in the larger context 
of the critical role of an independent judiciary in our democracy.  Alexander 
Hamilton said in the Federalist Papers that “[t]he complete independence of the 
courts of justice” was “essential” in a constitution that limited legislative authority.58  
Without the power of the courts to declare acts of the legislature contrary to the 
constitution, he suggested, the “rights and privileges [reserved to the people] would 
amount to nothing.”59  Hamilton also recognized that an independent judiciary was 
necessary to guard the rights of individuals from the will of the majority, who may 
wish to oppress a minority group in a manner incompatible with a constitutional 
provision.60  
                                                           
 56 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 57 Id. 
 58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 428-29. 
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These underpinnings of judicial independence were certainly tested in Iowa.  The 
stated purpose of the campaign against the justices was to send a message “in Iowa 
and across the country” that judges ignore the will of the people at their peril,61—a 
message of retaliation and intimidation utterly inconsistent with the concept of a 
judiciary charged with the responsibility to uphold the constitutional rights of all 
citizens. 
Before we can really understand how destructive such a message is to our 
democracy, it’s important to have a shared understanding of the foundation of our 
system of justice.  So let’s start there. 
C.  Rule of Law 
As I’m sure the people in this room know, America’s system of justice is based 
on the rule of law.  The rule of law is a process of governing by laws that are applied 
fairly and uniformly to all persons.  Because the same rules are applied in the same 
manner to everyone, the rule of law protects the civil, political, economic, and social 
rights of all citizens, not just the rights of the most vociferous, the most organized, 
the most popular, or the most powerful.  Applying the rule of law is the sum and 
substance of the work of the courts.  So when we speak of “judicial independence,” 
we are referring to a judiciary that is committed to the rule of law, independent of—
free of—outside influence, including personal bias or preference.     
Iowa, like other states, created a government under the rule of law when its 
citizens adopted a constitution that set forth the fundamental rules and principles that 
would apply to citizens and their government.  In fact, the Iowa Constitution 
expressly states:  “This constitution shall be the supreme law of the land,” and it 
goes on to say that “any law inconsistent therewith, shall be void.”62 
These constitutional provisions are given meaning by the courts because the 
judicial branch is responsible for resolving disputes between citizens and their 
government, including claims by citizens that the government has violated their 
constitutional rights.  Of course, the duty of courts to determine the constitutionality 
of statutes does not mean the judicial power is superior to legislative power.  Rather, 
when the legislature has enacted a statute inconsistent with the will of the people as 
expressed in their constitution, the courts must prefer the constitution over the 
statutes.  Thus, regardless of whether a particular result will be popular, courts must, 
under all circumstances, protect the supremacy of the constitution by declaring an 
unconstitutional statute void.  Only by protecting the supremacy of the constitution 
can citizens be assured that the freedoms and rights they included in their 
constitution will be preserved.  In this way, judicial review serves as an important 
check on the legislative and executive branches, ensuring a proper balance of power 
not only among the three branches of government but also between the people and 
their government. 
Of course, the people can always amend their constitution to ensure its content 
and meaning reflect current public opinion.  As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in 
The Federalist, however, until the people have amended the constitution, “it is 
binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption or 
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even knowledge of [the people’s] sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a 
departure from it.”63 
With this background in mind, let’s turn to the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 
Varnum decision. 
D.  Varnum Decision 
The events leading to this decision began when six same-sex couples applied for 
Iowa marriage licenses.  At that time and currently, Iowa’s marriage statute states: 
“Marriage is a civil contract, requiring the consent of the parties capable of entering 
into other contracts, except as herein otherwise provided.”64  One of the “except as 
herein otherwise provided” provisions is Iowa’s version of the defense of marriage 
act.  It provides: “Only a marriage between a male and a female is valid.”65  Based 
on this statute prohibiting civil contracts of marriage between persons of the same 
gender, the county recorder refused to issue marriage licenses to the six same-sex 
couples. 
These twelve Iowans then filed a lawsuit asking that the court order the county 
recorder to issue the requested licenses.66  They claimed the law limiting civil 
contracts of marriage to one man and one woman was unconstitutional and 
unenforceable.67  The constitutional provision upon which the couples relied in 
Varnum was the equality clause Iowans included in their constitution when Iowa 
became a state.  It provides in relevant part:  “[T]he general assembly shall not grant 
to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges . . . which, upon the same terms shall not 
equally belong to all citizens.”68   
The Iowa Supreme Court held the state law limiting civil contracts of marriage to 
one man and one woman violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  Specifically, 
the court determined the legislature’s restriction of the numerous privileges that flow 
from civil marriage to a limited class of citizens violated the plaintiffs’ equality 
rights under the Iowa Constitution.69  Because the Iowa Constitution expressly states 
that any law inconsistent with the constitution is void, the supreme court declared the 
offending statute void and granted the plaintiffs the relief they sought: an order that 
the county recorder could not rely on the unconstitutional restriction on the persons 
who could enter into civil contracts of marriage and was, therefore, obligated to issue 
licenses to the six same-sex couples who brought the lawsuit.70 
E.  The Retention Election 
Of course, the story does not end there.  The second chapter involves Iowa’s 
retention elections.  Iowa has a commission-based, merit selection process for 
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 65 Id. § 595.2(1). 
 66 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. 
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choosing judges known as the Missouri Plan.  The process begins with a fifteen-
member, nonpartisan commission that screens applicants for judicial office, 
reviewing extensive information about each applicant’s background, education, 
professional skills, and experience.71  After interviewing the applicants, the 
commission submits the names of the three most highly qualified candidates to the 
governor who is then required to pick the new judge from the commission’s 
nominees.72 
The other aspect of Iowa’s merit-selection process is retention elections.  In a 
retention election a judge runs unopposed and voters simply choose whether or not 
to retain a judge for another term.73  Historically, politics had played no role in 
judicial retention elections, and Iowa justices had not found it necessary to form 
campaign committees, to engage in fundraising, or to campaign in any manner.   
In the 2010 general election that followed the 2009 Varnum decision, three 
members of the Iowa Supreme Court were on the ballot for retention.  The 2010 
retention elections were very different from previous elections.  Because of our 
participation in the Varnum decision, the justices on the ballot were targeted by a 
Mississippi-based group, AFA Action, Inc.74  Persons supporting AFA’s campaign 
against the justices claimed the Iowa Supreme Court had overstepped its 
constitutional role “by declaring Iowa to be a ‘same-sex’ marriage state.”75  This 
claim was not based on a critique of the court’s legal analysis.  Not once did I hear 
our opponents claim that we had misinterpreted the Iowa Constitution in finding the 
defense of marriage act violated the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.  Rather, the 
court was criticized for ignoring the will of the people and for ruling contrary to 
God’s law.  This latter criticism was particularly troubling because the court had 
made an effort in the Varnum opinion to clarify the narrowness of its decision. 
As I noted earlier, the law at issue in the Varnum case governed a legal contract, 
not the religious institution of marriage.  The court pointed out this distinction in its 
opinion:   
Our constitution does not permit any branch of government to resolve . . . 
religious debates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government 
avoids them.  The statute at issue in this case does not prescribe a 
definition of marriage for religious institutions.  Instead, the statute 
declares: “Marriage is a civil contract” and then regulates that civil 
contract.  Thus, in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil 
judges, far removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, and 
focus only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licensing system 
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that identifies a limited class of persons entitled to secular rights and 
benefits associated with civil marriage.   
. . . . 
As a result, civil marriage must be judged under our constitutional 
standards of equal protection and not under religious doctrines or the 
religious views of individuals.76   
After holding Iowa’s constitution required that the state accord the same marital 
status and benefits to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, the court pointed out 
that “religious doctrine and views contrary to this [holding] are unaffected,” and “[a] 
religious denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman.”77   
Notwithstanding the fact that the court’s ruling did not affect religious beliefs or 
practices, substantial opposition to the justices’ retention came from individuals and 
groups who believed the court had violated God’s law or natural law.78  For example, 
through an effort called Project Jeremiah, preachers were urged to use their pulpits to 
advocate for a no vote on retention of the justices, which many did.79  In fact, one 
leader of the campaign against retention declared after the election, Iowa voters had 
done “God’s will by standing up to the three judges who would try to redefine God’s 
institution.”80  One has to wonder if the persons campaigning against us even read 
the decision because, as I have pointed out, the court expressly avoided redefining 
the religious institution of marriage. 
But the campaign against the justices was about more than same-sex marriage.  It 
became an assault on the power of the court itself.  As I have already mentioned, the 
main leader of the campaign against the justices was a Mississippi group affiliated 
with the American Family Association.  AFA called its Iowa program, Iowa For 
Freedom.81 This group’s local spokesperson argued, “appointed judges [are] 
dictating from the bench which societal beliefs are acceptable and which ones are 
not.”82  He claimed the retention election was not about gay marriage; it was about 
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liberty.83  Asserting the court “legislated from the bench,” he said, “If they will do 
this for marriage, all your liberties are up for grabs.”84  In a television ad sponsored 
by Iowa for Freedom, the National Organization for Marriage, and the Campaign for 
Working Families, the narrator told viewers “If they can redefine marriage, none of 
the freedoms we hold dear are safe from judicial activism.”85  
I probably do not need to tell this audience that the Iowa Supreme Court took 
away no one’s liberties or freedoms in the Varnum decision.  To the contrary, the 
civil rights of same-sex couples to the secular benefits that flow from the civil 
contract of marriage were upheld.  Moreover, the views of individuals and religious 
institutions were unaffected by this decision and their religious freedom to define the 
religious institution of marriage as only between one man and one woman was 
expressly preserved.  
You might be wondering: What was the response to these inaccurate and 
demonizing attacks on the judiciary?  As for the justices themselves, we decided 
early on not to form campaign committees and not to engage in any fundraising.  
This decision reflected our collective view of our role as judges.  Judges must be fair 
and impartial.  They cannot be obligated to campaign contributors and just as 
importantly, they should not be perceived as beholden to campaign contributors.  We 
strongly believed our role as fair and impartial members of the Iowa Supreme Court 
would have been forever tarnished had we engaged in fundraising and campaigning.  
We decided we would not contribute to the politicization of the judiciary in Iowa 
even though we knew this decision might cost us our jobs.  Our hope was that the 
bar association and others would come to our aid.  They did, but not with the vigor 
and money that was required to counteract the emotionally laden and factually 
inaccurate television ads that ran incessantly for the three months prior to the 
election.  
F.  Threat to an Independent Judiciary 
Dealing with controversial issues has always been part of being a judge, and 
certainly, public debate about the merits of court decisions is a healthy aspect of a 
democratic society.  But what message is sent when a retention election is used as a 
referendum on a particular court decision?  What message is sent when it is used to 
intimidate judges who in the future will be called upon to make politically unpopular 
decisions? 
Opponents of the Varnum decision argued judges must be held accountable to the 
people when the court makes a decision the people do not like.  But the message they 
were really sending was that judges should rule in accordance with public opinion 
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even when that means ignoring the constitution.  I read an article by a Minnesota 
judge who responded to similar contentions with this observation:   
It might sound good to have judges “accountable to the people.”  But 
which people?  Should judges be accountable to those who shout the 
loudest or make the most threats?  Should judges be accountable to the 
majority?  If so, what happens to the rights of the minority?  And what 
happens to a judge’s responsibility to uphold the law and the 
Constitution?  When a judge starts to worry about who [the judge] will 
please or displease with a ruling, then we cease to be a government based 
on law.86 
Just consider the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.87  If public opinion were the standard by which judges should make 
decisions, that case would probably have had a different outcome.  The court’s 
decision in Brown was unpopular with many, many people at the time, yet that 
decision is now universally respected.  As former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has 
observed, the Brown decision was “an exercise in accountability to the Rule of Law 
over the popular will.”88  
I think the Varnum decision was as well.  I can assure you the members of our 
court were very much aware when we issued our decision in Varnum that it would 
unleash a wave of criticism, and we knew we could possibly lose our jobs because of 
our vote in that case.  Nonetheless, we remained true to our oath of office in which 
we promised to uphold the Iowa Constitution without fear, favor or hope of reward.89 
It should come as no surprise that judges are most at risk when they uphold the 
rights of politically unpopular minorities against the wishes of the majority.  As 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, “It is of great importance in a republic 
not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one 
part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”90  The founding fathers 
recognized that an independent judiciary was of critical importance in safeguarding 
the rights of all parts of society.  Hamilton made the realistic observation that, in 
such situations, “it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to 
do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution.”91   
The fortitude of many judges will be tested in the coming years.  The groups who 
were successful in Iowa have vowed they will not stop with the removal of three 
justices from the Iowa Supreme Court.92  Moreover, the opposition to same-sex 
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marriage that drove the anti-retention efforts in Iowa is only one aspect of a larger 
movement to meld the religious views of evangelical Christians into the fabric of our 
government and our laws.  In fact, earlier this year over 400 Iowa ministers attended 
an expense-paid, two-day Pastors’ Policy Briefing in West Des Moines, Iowa where 
they heard from Newt Gingrich, Haley Barbour, Michele Bachmann, and Mike 
Huckabee, all possible 2012 presidential contenders at the time.93  Huckabee told the 
crowd, “We face a spiritual war in this country.”94  According to a New York Times 
article, “[t]he audience heard how to push their flocks to register and vote along 
‘biblical principles.’”95  This effort continues tomorrow night when five presidential 
candidates will appear at a presidential candidate forum in Des Moines sponsored by 
the Iowa Faith & Freedom Coalition, a conservative Christian group that opposes 
LGBT rights.96     
By using these examples, I don’t mean to single out evangelical Christians.  
Groups interested in social issues are not the only ones that might benefit from a 
politicized judiciary.  All one has to do is examine the facts culminating in the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.97 to 
realize that individuals and corporations contributing to judicial campaigns also hope 
to influence the candidate’s judicial decision making. In that case, the president of 
Massey Coal Company contributed over $3 million to elect Brent Benjamin to the 
West Virginia Supreme Court.98  After his election, Justice Benjamin refused to 
recuse himself from an appeal that had been filed by the coal company.99  So all five 
justices on the West Virginia Supreme Court participated in the appeal, and they 
reversed a fifty million dollar judgment against the coal company on a vote of 3-2.100      
I have no doubt that the groups that were active in the 2010 Iowa retention 
election as well as other special interest groups will be emboldened by the events in 
Iowa and seek to intimidate and influence judges by the threat of removal from 
office.   My fear is that efforts to intimidate the judiciary will, over time, destroy the 
ability and willingness of judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the 
Constitution or will result in the election or selection only of judges who agree to 
adhere to a certain agenda.  
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I hope we never reach the point in this country that judges become no more than 
politicians in robes, deciding cases in accordance with public opinion polls or based 
on what will satisfy their campaign contributors.  And I greatly fear the current effort 
to transform judges into theologians in robes, ignoring the rule of law in favor of 
Biblical guidance.  If the day comes that judges make decisions as politicians or 
theologians, this society and our democracy are in serious trouble.  Only an 
independent judiciary can ensure that the minority is protected from the tyranny of 
the majority.  Only an independent judiciary committed to the rule of law can 
safeguard every citizen’s liberties and rights. 
Politicized judicial elections undermine judicial independence, make no mistake 
about it.  Over time this trend will result in a judiciary that is less and less likely to 
be fair and impartial.  Why?   
First, there is the real and perceived corrupting influence of campaign 
fundraising.  Do we really believe that special interest groups and corporations who 
support a judicial candidate do not expect that person, once elected, to vote a certain 
way on certain issues?  Of course, they do.  And that expectation will not be lost on 
some judges.  Second, aside from the fundraising aspect of politicized judicial 
elections, threats of retaliation and intimidation will be understood by sitting judges.  
Sadly, some judges will be discouraged from following the rule of law when to do so 
will lead to an unpopular outcome.  As Justice O’Connor has said:  “The law 
sometimes demands unpopular outcomes, and a judge who is forced to weigh what is 
popular rather than focusing solely on what the law demands has lost some . . . . 
impartiality.”101     
Ironically, politicized judicial elections undermine our democracy even when 
judges elected or retained in such elections adhere to the rule of law.   Even if judges 
have the courage to disappoint their campaign contributors or ignore the threats of 
special interest groups, fundraising and campaigning by judges blur the distinction 
between judges and politicians.  When judges are viewed by citizens as politicians, 
as susceptible to influence, confidence in the courts is undermined, and the integrity 
and validity of court decisions become suspect.   
I’m not being alarmist.  I have seen first hand the impact of politicized elections 
on the court as an institution.  Let me give you an example.  I was on the Iowa 
Supreme Court for seventeen years, and I had never heard the integrity of our court 
or the motivation for our decisions questioned, directly or indirectly.  But in the two 
months after the 2010 retention election that I served before my term expired, I 
witnessed two incidents that showed me the view of our court had been changed 
forever.  In two different cases, attorneys challenged orders the Supreme Court had 
entered, claiming in very direct terms that our orders in those cases were politically 
motivated.  Never had I seen such claims in pleadings or otherwise in seventeen 
years on the court, but I saw two in the two months I served after the election. 
So whether we are talking about the actual corrupting influence of campaign 
contributions and judicial intimidation or simply the perception that the judiciary can 
be influenced, politicized judicial elections pose serious risks to our democracy.  Our 
government can only function as it was intended to function if the checks and 
balances envisioned by our founding fathers are preserved.  One of those checks and 
balances is the duty of courts to declare laws inconsistent with the constitution void. 
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Clearly, the principles and rights enshrined in our federal and state constitutions will 
be preserved and given meaning only if they are supported and enforced by a fair, 
impartial and independent judiciary.  But more is required.  Court decisions find 
their legitimacy in the willingness of the other branches of government and our 
citizens to abide by those decisions.  Can that legitimacy be sustained, however, if 
court decisions are perceived to have no integrity?     
G.  Conclusion 
At the end of the day, the debate about controversial court decisions and the 
judges who make them boils down to a simple question: What kind of court system 
do Americans want?  A court system that issues rulings based upon public opinion 
polls, campaign contributions, and political intimidation or a court system that issues 
impartial rulings based upon the rule of law?  If we as Americans want our 
freedoms, liberties and rights protected by a fair and impartial judiciary, we must 
support the courts even when the rights they uphold are not our own, but those of a 
politically unpopular minority. 
A former dean of the Yale Law School, Robert Maynard Hutchins, once warned:  
The level of understanding, or rather lack of understanding, of basic civics 
is an actual threat to the future stability of the Republic. If our nation’s 
populace does not understand the role of the three coequal branches of 
their government, then it will not be long before the future stability of the 
foundation for that government will be susceptible to becoming 
irrevocably compromised.102 
He continues with this forewarning, “It has been stated that the death of 
democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush.  It will be a slow 
extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.”103  I agree with Dean 
Hutchins and think that what happened in Iowa is a sad step in that direction.    
It’s very easy to take what we have in America for granted, especially when we 
learn of the tyrannical regimes in other parts of the world.  But Dean Hutchins’ 
underlying message is correct: America is not immune from disintegration.  There is 
no guarantee that our children and grandchildren will enjoy the fair and impartial 
justice we have enjoyed.  Our children and grandchildren will only know true justice 
if we fight to preserve it.  It is the responsibility of everyone in this room to support 
and advocate for a judiciary with integrity, one free from the political influence and 
intimidation of special interest groups and campaign contributors.  Only if citizens 
have an unwavering commitment to an independent judiciary can we assure future 
generations that they too will enjoy a society governed by the rule of law and not by 
the tyranny of the majority.  
Thank you so much for having me here today. 
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IV.  BULLYING THE BENCH 
CAMILLA B. TAYLOR104 
In the last decade, the marriage equality movement has transformed itself from a 
wishful rallying cry of an oppressed few into a mainstream movement whose time 
has come.  Indeed, for many young people, the struggle for the freedom to marry has 
become the civil rights struggle of a generation.  A May 2011 Gallup poll for the 
first time documented majority public support for same-sex couples’ freedom to 
marry.105  Among eighteen to thirty-four year-olds, who will be the future majority-
voting block, support for marriage equality is now at 70%. 
These developments in public opinion reflect changes in positive law.  As of 
October 2011, six states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex couples to 
marry.  A federal trial court ruled that so-called “Proposition 8,” a ballot measure 
that stripped the freedom to marry from Californians by a small voter margin in 
2008, is unconstitutional.  Marriage legislation is likely to move forward this year in 
several states.  Eight states provide same-sex couples and their children access to a 
comprehensive lesser legal status for family recognition (such as “civil unions” or 
“domestic partnerships”), through which these states make available the majority of 
the state law protections, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage.  Still, more states 
offer a more limited menu of protections to same-sex couples as well.  Court 
challenges to the federal so-called “Defense of Marriage Act,” which denies federal 
respect to marriages of same-sex couples, move forward in several federal circuits, 
and the Obama administration has determined that the law is indefensible and 
unconstitutional, leaving defense of the law up to Republican leadership in 
Congress. 
However, these advances for lesbian and gay couples and their children have not 
come easily.  Opponents of marriage equality have fought back with varying tactics 
and varying degrees of success.  For example, antigay groups have used ballot 
measures to insert exclusionary provisions in the constitutions of twenty-nine states.  
Antigay groups also have fought to exempt their supporters from generally 
applicable laws requiring disclosure of donors and petition-signers, although these 
efforts have been unsuccessful to date.106  Worse, they have attacked the impartiality 
of the courts, targeting individual jurists who have ruled that excluding same-sex 
couples and their children from marriage deprives these families of constitutional 
guarantees of liberty and equality.  Time will tell, but this last tactic is the one that 
may have the most lasting and destructive impact on our system of justice, our 
societal understanding of the equality guarantee, and indeed, on our constitutional 
democracy itself. 
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A.  Reaction to Varnum v. Brien 
On November 2, 2010, the marriage equality movement suffered a blow. Well-
funded antigay groups succeeded in ousting from office three well-respected Iowa 
Supreme Court justices who were up for what should have been routine retention 
elections.  These groups targeted the justices because they had joined in a 2009 
unanimous opinion in Lambda Legal’s lawsuit, Varnum v. Brien,107 which struck 
down Iowa’s marriage ban and ordered marriage licenses issued to same-sex 
couples.  
Led by American Family Association, the antigay groups included the Family 
Research Council, the Alliance Defense Fund, the Faith and Freedom Coalition and 
the National Organization for Marriage.108  Together they poured more than one 
million dollars into a campaign, culminating in a twenty-city bus tour, urging Iowa 
voters to kick the justices off the Court.109  Supporters of the justices amassed only a 
small fraction of that sum.  The justices themselves declined to fund raise or 
campaign on their own behalf, deeming it unseemly for sitting judges to create an 
appearance of pandering for votes.110  
The justices lost by a vote of 54 percent to 45 percent.  
Antigay groups’ decision to target Iowa’s justices was designed to intimidate 
judges in Iowa and across the nation, and to bully lesbian and gay people into being 
fearful of bringing discrimination claims to court.  However, the loss of these 
justices had no impact on Iowa’s substantive law, including the right to marry for 
lesbian and gay couples.  The Court’s ruling in Varnum is still the law of the land, 
and the right to marry remains enshrined in the Iowa Constitution.  Thousands of 
same-sex couples have already married in Iowa, and more couples marry every day.  
Opponents of equality for gay and lesbian couples chose to attack Iowa’s justices 
precisely because they knew that they were unlikely ever to be able to roll back 
marriage equality.  When the unanimous high court decision in Varnum came down 
in April 2009, the Iowa Senate Majority Leader, Mike Gronstal, and then-House 
Speaker Pat Murphy vowed to oppose calls to amend Iowa’s constitution to preclude 
gay and lesbian couples from marrying.  Gronstal and Murphy issued a joint 
statement heralding the decision as a victory for civil rights, stating that “‘When all 
is said and done, we believe the only lasting question about today’s events will be 
why it took us so long.’”111  Then-governor Chet Culver also opposed amending 
Iowa’s constitution.  More than one public opinion poll in Iowa conducted since the 
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decision demonstrates that a majority of Iowans do not want a constitutional 
amendment, and a recent poll now demonstrates majority support for lesbian and gay 
couples’ right to marry.112 
While the 2010 election results diminished the number of political officeholders 
who support equality, a constitutional amendment still appears unlikely.  Amending 
the Iowa Constitution requires a vote in both chambers of the legislature in two 
consecutive two-year general assemblies.  The earliest this could happen is 2014.  
Then the amendment could go to the public for a vote.  However, although current 
Governor Terry Branstad, who assumed the governorship last year after a twelve-
year hiatus, supports an amendment, and Pat Murphy has lost his majority in the 
Iowa House, Mike Gronstal remains the senate majority leader, and he continues to 
state in no uncertain terms that his commitment to prevent a constitutional 
amendment remains firm, no matter the pressure.  “The easy political thing for me to 
do years ago would have been to say, ‘Oh, let’s let this thing go.  It’s just too 
political and too messy,’” Gronstal said. “What’s ugly is giving up what you believe 
in, that everybody has the same rights.  Giving up on that?  That’s ugly.”113 
However, even though the retention vote failed to change the law, the vote 
nevertheless was “a body blow to the principle of an independent judiciary insulated 
from popular sentiment,” as Iowa’s largest newspaper, the Des Moines Register, 
editorialized shortly after the election.114  An Iowa judge stands for retention every 
eight years.  Retention elections are usually unremarkable, and intended not to 
provide a referendum on individual court decisions but to allow voters a say about 
the overall competence of judges or specific instances of corruption, neither of which 
was even an issue in this election.  Since 1962, when the current system was 
adopted, no Iowa Supreme Court justice ever has lost a retention election.115  
Attacking justices for participation in one decision, no matter how unpopular, 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the courts, and constitutes a 
misuse of the retention process.  As the Iowa Courts website states:  
Although it may be appropriate for politicians to consider public opinion and the 
views of special interest groups when drafting laws and regulations, it is never 
appropriate for judges to do so when deciding cases.  Judges must remain impartial.  
In this respect, the judiciary is very different from the other two branches of 
government.  Judges are accountable to the Constitution and the law—not political 
pressure.116 
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B.  Civil Rights Decisions in Iowa 
Iowa’s judiciary has a long proud history of independence and leadership on civil 
rights issues.  As the New York Times noted, “[f]rom its first decision in 1839, the 
Iowa Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to push ahead of public opinion on 
matters of minority rights, ruling against slavery, school segregation and 
discrimination decades before the national mood shifted toward racial equality.”117  
In 1839, when the Iowa Supreme Court comprised only three members, Chief 
Justice Charles Mason authored the Court’s first published opinion in In re Ralph.118  
A Missouri slave owner had sued for the return of Ralph, a man whom the 
Missourian had permitted to come to Iowa to work toward the purchase of his 
freedom.  When Ralph failed to come up with sufficient money, the Missourian sent 
bounty hunters to collect him and sued in Iowa court for his return.  Twenty-six 
years before ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, an Iowa court rejected the 
Missourian’s claim.  Chief Justice Mason wrote, “no man in this territory can be 
reduced to slavery.”119  The decision stands in sharp contrast to the infamous Dred 
Scott decision eighteen years later, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even 
in free states, slaves had no legal claim to freedom. 
Thirty years after In re Ralph, and nearly a century before Brown v. Board of 
Education, Iowa Justice Chester Cole authored a decision desegregating Iowa’s 
schools, rejecting a “separate but equal” system of public education for African 
American children.  In Clark v. Board of Directors,120 Susan B. Clark, a twelve-year-
old African American girl, brought suit after a public school denied her admission 
because of her race.  Justice Cole acknowledged that “public sentiment” opposed 
“the intermingling of white and colored children.”121  Nevertheless, he held that a 
local school board had no authority to deny African American children the right to 
equal education on that ground.   To bend to discriminatory majoritarian impulses in 
such a way would “sanction a plain violation of the spirit of our laws,” he stated. 
In addition to trailblazing on racial justice issues, the Iowa Supreme Court led the 
way in numerous instances involving women’s rights.  Iowa courts were the first in 
the nation to admit a woman to the practice of law.122  In 1869, Arabella Mansfield 
became the first woman in the United States admitted to the bar in any state—three 
years before the U.S. Supreme Court determined that an Illinois woman had no right 
to practice law.  The Iowa high court also was one of the first to establish that the 
Nineteenth Amendment, in extending to women the right to vote, made women 
eligible for jury service.  
The Iowa Supreme Court’s protection of minorities extended to religious groups 
as well. In the early years of the twentieth century, the Court fought back against 
state government’s attack on the corporate existence of the Amana Society, a 
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religious settlement whose members believed in the communal ownership of 
property.  The Court held that the state’s corporate laws were restrained by the 
Society’s members’ right to religious freedom: “Each individual must determine for 
himself what limit he shall place upon his aspirations. . . . Under the blessings of free 
government, every citizen should be permitted to pursue that mode of life which is 
dictated by his own conscience . . . .”123 
C.  Iowa Allows Same-Sex Marriage 
Lambda Legal relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s extraordinary history of 
prescience and integrity when we filed our lawsuit on behalf of six same-sex couples 
seeking to marry in their home state of Iowa in December 2005.  At the time that we 
filed, only one state in the country—Massachusetts—permitted same-sex couples to 
marry.  Many commentators around the nation who were less familiar with Iowa’s 
proud tradition of leadership on matters involving equality and liberty questioned 
why we would file a marriage equality lawsuit in the heartland when states on the 
coasts had not yet embraced it.  However, we had faith that we would get a fair 
hearing. 
We were right. A Polk County trial court struck down the marriage ban in August 
2007. After Polk County appealed, the case went directly to the Iowa Supreme 
Court.  
Iowa became the third state, after Massachusetts and Connecticut, in which 
same-sex couples could marry, followed quickly thereafter by Vermont, New 
Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia. (More than eighteen thousand 
couples had validly married in California, as well, before the enactment of 
Proposition 8 prevented further couples from marrying in that state, and Maine 
briefly enacted marriage equality through legislation before a referendum prevented 
it from going into effect.)  The decision was the first unanimous high court opinion 
on marriage for same-sex couples.  The Court spoke in plain language, explaining 
that the six Iowa couples and their children had been denied basic freedoms and 
security guaranteed to all Iowans on equal terms. 
The Varnum justices were aware that their opinion might not enjoy majority 
support, but it was the only decision they could take; they had taken oaths to uphold 
the Iowa Constitution’s promise of equality and it was up to them to breathe new life 
into it, as the Court had done so many times in generations past.  At both oral 
argument and in the written opinion in the case the Court diligently explained the 
legal review process and the role of the Court to the public:  
Our responsibility . . . is to protect constitutional rights of individuals 
from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even when the 
rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time unimagined, 
or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be impervious 
to the passage of time.124 
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D.  The Justices of the Varnum Court 
The three unseated Iowa justices were a bipartisan group unfairly characterized 
as “activist.”  The Varnum Court comprised both Democratic and Republican 
appointees.  Justice Mark Cady, who authored the opinion, is often described as one 
of the more conservative members of the Court, and was appointed by former (and 
incoming) Republican governor Terry Branstad.  The three unseated justices—Chief 
Justice Marsha Ternus, Justice Michael Streit, and Justice David Baker—were 
skilled jurists and native Iowans known more for their long years of respected 
service on the bench than for adherence to any particular ideology. 
Chief Justice Ternus grew up on a farm in northern Iowa, attending Drake and 
the University of Iowa.  Republican governor Branstad appointed her to Iowa’s 
Supreme Court in 1993, and her fellow members of the Court elected her as chief 
justice in 2006.  She is the first woman to serve as chief justice of Iowa’s highest 
court.  As chief, she made her highest priority the improvement of court oversight 
for children caught in the court system, chairing the State Childrens’ Justice Council.  
In 2009, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Roberts appointed 
her to the national Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction.  
Married with three children, she and her family attended a Catholic church in West 
Des Moines. 
Justice Streit was born and raised in Sheldon, Iowa.  Governor Branstad 
appointed him as a district court judge in 1983, and later to the Iowa Court of 
Appeals in 1996, before Streit was appointed to the high court in 2001.  He chaired 
the Judges Association Education Committee and speaks frequently before Rotary 
Clubs, churches, Jaycees, Kiwanis, and Boy Scout groups. 
Justice Baker, the most recent appointee to the Iowa Supreme Court in 2008 after 
serving both as a district court and appellate judge, was born in Muscatine, Iowa, 
grew up in Waterloo, and went to college and law school at the University of Iowa.  
He participated in writing Iowa’s Appellate Practice Manual and served on Iowa’s 
Ethics and Grievance Committee.  Past president of the Cedar Rapids West Rotary 
Club and a board member of the United Way, he proudly noted in his web biography 
his participation in the creation of a local bike trail and duties as a volunteer swim 
coach at the YMCA.  
Although profiles in courage, these justices hardly stood out as candidates for the 
label “activist.”  However, the out-of-state extremist organizations that targeted them 
had no concern for truth.  Their aim was to paint the justices as “robed masters and 
judicial activists imposing their will on the rest of us.”125  
E.  Reaction 
The retention elections shine light on antigay extremist organizations’ agenda to 
undermine the system of checks and balances that has served us well for over two 
hundred years.  Since the election, opponents of equality for gay and lesbian couples 
have exulted in the ouster of the three justices. “‘Taking on the judicial class,’” Newt 
Gingrich reportedly said to supporters, “and telling judges that ‘we are not going to 
tolerate enforced secularization of our country,’ is ‘one of the most important things 
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we can engage in.’”126  David Barton, a Texas antigay activist, crowed, “‘[t]his is 
what we call hanging a bloody scalp on the gallery rail.’”127  The National 
Organization for Marriage has already said that it intends to target Iowa retention 
elections in 2012 and 2016.  
The targeting of the Iowa justices was not just an attack on three skilled jurists, 
or on the outcome of one case—it was an attack on the constitutional equality 
guarantee itself.  The constitutional guarantee of equality is inherently a counter-
majoritarian principle.  If the right to equal protection means anything, it means that 
courts are empowered to strike down a piece of legislation—regardless of whether it 
enjoys majority support—when that legislation targets a minority for unequal 
treatment.  Indeed, it is the absolute obligation of a court to do so.  If a slim majority 
can unseat a court solely for upholding the rights of a minority against majority 
attack, then what is the point of a constitutional guarantee of equality at all? 
Political attacks on the judiciary for courts’ commitment to equality are nothing 
new.  In 1954, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown vs. Board of Education 
that state-mandated segregation in public schools violated the U.S. Constitution, 
some cried that the Court had overstepped its role and usurped power from the 
legislature.  Billboards to “Impeach Earl Warren” littered the South.128  If Iowa Chief 
Justice Charles Mason had faced a retention vote after In re Ralph in 1839, or Justice 
Chester Cole had done so after Clark v. Board of Education, they likely would have 
had difficulty retaining their seats, too.  Fortunately for these jurists, now widely 
admired as heroes, they were not subject to a politicized retention election process.  
The founders of our nation understood in structuring our federal judiciary that if 
courts are not insulated from voters who disagree with particular decisions, then 
majorities will have the power to strip fundamental rights away from minorities—
and our cherished principles of liberty and freedom will disappear. 
As retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has noted, 
our judicial system will fail to work if litigants become concerned that a  
[J]udge is more accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological 
group than to the law.  In our system, the judiciary, unlike the legislative 
and the executive branches, is supposed to answer only to the law and the 
Constitution.  Courts are supposed to be the one safe place where every 
citizen can receive a fair hearing.129   
A judge who is forced to weigh what is popular rather than focusing solely on 
what the law demands loses independence and impartiality.  If an embattled judiciary 
were to lose its ability to protect our laws and constitution with impartiality, that 
would be a tragic loss for our country.  “‘Judges have to be assured,’ Justice 
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O’Connor said, that ‘they’re not going to be subject to political retaliation for their 
judicial acts.’”130 
Newly empowered antigay groups also will lobby heavily the Republican Iowa 
house and governor to insist upon passage of a constitutional amendment.  Iowa 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Gronstal will face great pressure in the coming years 
from those who would put a constitutional amendment on the ballot.  
Nevertheless, we have reason to be hopeful.  Numerous Iowans expressed shock 
and heartbreak upon learning of the justices’ defeat.  The Des Moines Register’s 
editorial board condemned the retention vote as a “black mark on Iowa history.”  
Many equality advocates had been complacent about the justices’ retention prospects 
and underestimated the impact of a million dollar campaign waged from out of state.  
(In a previous election in 2006, when Iowa antigay activists had targeted a trial judge 
up for retention in a conservative county because the judge had granted two lesbian 
women’s request for a dissolution from their civil union, the judge had survived with 
little difficulty.)  Cedar Rapids Gazette columnist Todd Dorman wrote on November 
3 that history may “recall this as the moment when fair-minded Iowans who support 
equality for all under the law finally realized that they’ve got a fight on their hands.  
And they decided to do something about it.”131  He also cautioned against 
underestimating the level of support in Iowa for marriage rights for same-sex 
couples, as voters’ personal investment in three judges keeping their jobs cannot be 
equated with voters’ commitment to the continued right to marry for same-sex 
couples and the guarantee of equality precious to all Iowans.  As the Dubuque 
Telegraph Herald noted, “the number of Iowans who actually wanted the three 
justices removed because of the same-sex marriage ruling might be somewhat 
overstated [by the results of the retention election]. In a normal year when judges 
and justices are on the ballot, some 30 percent typically vote ‘no,’ even when there 
are no apparent issues.” 
Iowa’s loss of three skilled and experienced jurists was a wake-up call for all of 
us. It is the responsibility of every voter to protect the system of checks and balances 
that defines our democracy.  We must make sure that the next time extremists target 
jurists for deciding cases with integrity, we are more prepared to take on the fight. 
Here at Lambda Legal, it continues to be our responsibility to make our case for 
equality, not just before judges, but in the court of public opinion. We cannot allow 
bullies to intimidate us.  We must continue to bring cases on behalf of people who 
have been wronged, and we have faith that the courts remain a refuge for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender people, and people with HIV who have suffered 
discrimination and been deprived basic freedoms.  But we must do more than win in 
court; we must win hearts and minds and educate the public on how our 
constitutional democracy is supposed to work.  The members of the Varnum Court 
took an oath to defend the Iowa Constitution and earned their place in history when 
they lived up to it with integrity.  It is up to the rest of us to vindicate them by 
creating a world in which equality is so embraced and celebrated that the portraits of 
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Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker hang proudly next to Justice 
Mason’s and Justice Cole’s in the Court’s rotunda—in a pantheon of Iowa heroes 
who did the right thing before much of the rest of the country was ready.  We have 
some work to do to get to that day.  But we firmly believe we will see it. 
V.  A TOXIC BREW: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE AGE OF BIG-MONEY POLITICS 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI∗ 
A.  Introduction 
For those who care about judicial independence, Iowa’s 2010 election is a major 
wake-up call.  Three sitting justices of the state supreme court were denied retention 
by the statewide electorate as a direct result of their decision in Varnum v. Brien,132 
upholding the right of same-sex couples to marry.  There can be little doubt that this 
chain of events will make judges in controversial cases think twice before issuing 
decisions in support of an unpopular person or group.  The events in Iowa will be in 
the back of their minds, if not in front.  For those like me who think that one of the 
most important roles of our courts is to protect the rights of everyone, including 
those who are unpopular with the majority of the citizenry, this is a deeply troubling 
prospect.  Even if we view the result in Iowa’s retention election as an isolated 
incident, it is worrisome.  Though I’ve never heard any judge admit that the 
imperative to attract votes or campaign money affects their decisionmaking, state 
judges cannot help but be aware of what happened in Iowa.  
It would be bad enough that judicial independence is threatened by the prospect 
of state judges standing before an angry electorate to defend an unpopular decision.  
But it actually gets even worse.  And it’s this “worse” part that I am going to focus 
on in my remarks today.  It is even worse because of the combined effect of two 
developments.  The first is the high degree of political polarization that presently 
exists, a phenomenon exemplified in the campaign over judicial retention in Iowa.  
The second is the rise and intensification of big-money politics.  These two elements 
have together created a toxic brew.  These developments are not only harmful to 
judicial independence, but also threaten to move us even further toward a judicial 
system that caters to the interests of wealthy individuals and corporations, while 
ignoring the needs of ordinary citizens, especially those at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic ladder.  In sum, we face the risk of a judicial system that even more 
closely resembles our current pay-to-play political system.  They present reason to 
be concerned that what’s happened in Iowa is a harbinger of things to come, 
portending serious problems for the majority of states that have judicial elections.  
My remarks today proceed as follows.  After very briefly reviewing the history 
of judicial elections, I discuss two megatrends: the polarization and monetization of 
politics.  I then address the impact they can be expected to have—and may already 
be having—on state judiciaries.  I conclude by talking about what might be done.   
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B.  History 
The best place to start is with the United States Constitution.  Article III provides 
that judges both of the Supreme Court and inferior courts shall hold their offices 
during good behavior.  This provides the federal judiciary with independence—
insulation from the shifting winds of public opinion—and therefore the capacity to 
protect unpopular individuals and groups against the tyranny of the majority.  The 
Framers recognized that the judiciary would serve an important counter-majoritarian 
function in our Republic by protecting minorities.  They weren’t thinking of gays 
and lesbians, but Article III was designed to ensure that federal judges wouldn’t be 
swayed by negative public opinion when hearing the claims of unpopular or 
vulnerable groups.    
States followed suit at the beginning of the Republic.  Until 1845, every state that 
entered the union had an appointed judiciary.133  But in a very short period of time, 
largely as result of Jacksonian democracy and the spirit that it brought with it, things 
changed.  The states that were admitted in the twenty years after 1845 elected their 
judiciaries so that by 1865, twenty-four of the thirty-four states had judicial 
elections.134   
At the beginning of the twentieth century, some academics and lawyers raised 
questions about the system of electing judges.135  There was concern much like that 
which we have heard today, about the politicization of the judiciary.  As a result, 
starting in the early 1900s, states made some changes.  A number of them, twelve by 
1927, had switched to nonpartisan elections.136  But many people realized that this 
step wasn’t enough to protect the independence of state court judges, and so 
Missouri in 1940 adopted a system that is widely used still today: merit-based 
selection of judges followed by unopposed but regular retention elections.137  In the 
decades that followed, a number of states moved to the Missouri plan which strikes 
something of a balance between on the one hand insuring independence, while on 
the other hand providing some degree of accountability.   
While the above presents an exceedingly brief summary of a long and 
complicated history,138 even this limited context should suffice to demonstrate that 
the current controversy over judicial elections is nothing new.  And the central 
question has not much changed over the course of this history: Do we want greater 
independence or do we want greater accountability?  In the remarks that follow, I 
argue that even if you are someone who falls more on the accountability side of the 
spectrum, there are reasons to be very worried about our current system, including 
not only the direct election of judges but also retention elections.    
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Today, 89% of state judges must stand for election.139  For state high courts, nine 
states elect judges through partisan elections, another thirteen through nonpartisan 
elections, while judges are appointed as an initial matter in the remaining twenty-
eight states.140  Twenty states have some form of retention elections for their state 
high court judges (six partisan and fourteen nonpartisan).141  In recent decades we 
have seen more contested elections.  Between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of 
contested elections increased from 44% to 75%.142  We have also seen an increase in 
the rate at which incumbents as in Iowa are losing elections.  The incumbent loss 
rate doubled going from 4% to 8% between 1980 and 2000.143   
C.  Iowa 
Most worrisome are the cases, uncommon though they may be, in which justices 
are not retained.  The most notable recent example is the focal point of this 
conference.  In 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court Justices, Michael Streit, David 
Baker, and Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, were ousted.  There was just one issue 
behind their ouster—their decision in Varnum striking down the ban on same-sex 
marriage.  The aspect of judicial elections on which I’ll focus is the money spent in 
these elections.    
Almost one million dollars was spent against the Iowa justices.144  Over $900,000 
of that amount came from out-of-state groups that were ideologically opposed to the 
decision: the National Organization for Marriage based in Washington, D.C.; the 
American Family Association’s AFA Action, Inc. of Tupelo, Mississippi; and the 
Campaign for Working Families PAC of Arlington, Virginia.145  By comparison, just 
over $424,000 was spent in support of the justices,146 which means that opponents of 
retention outspent supporters by more than a two-to-one margin.  Now one million 
dollars may sound like a lot, but it’s significantly less than the average winner spent 
on U.S. House races in 2010.147  But for reasons I explain below, this may be just the 
tip of the iceberg when it comes to spending to judicial elections.   
At the same time, we shouldn’t exaggerate the frequency with which this type of 
event occurs.  The closest historical parallel to Iowa’s 2010 retention election is 
something that happened in my home state of California twenty-five years ago.  In 
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1986, three California Supreme Court Justices, Joseph Grodin, Cruz Reynoso, and 
Rose Bird, were ousted by voters.  Again, a single issue that was at least mainly 
responsible for their ouster.  Specifically, the issue that drove the ouster was that 
these justices overturned death sentences at a time when the death penalty was very 
popular in California.148  There were other criminal justice issues on the table, but the 
death penalty was the issue on which the electorate was principally focused at the 
time.  In that election, $6.6 million was spent against the justices, much of it coming 
from agricultural and business interests.149  By comparison $4.1 million was spent in 
support of the justices.  
Even though the public focal point of the anti-retention campaign was the death 
penalty; this wasn’t the real concern of the interest groups that were opposing these 
justices.  They were more concerned about decisions by these liberal justices in favor 
of consumers and workers than they were about the death penalty.  But these interest 
groups used the death penalty as the focal point of their campaign for ousting these 
justices.  This is something we could see more of in the future: wealthy interests 
using an unpopular decision on a wedge social issue to campaign against justices, 
when their real agenda has to do with an entirely different set of issues.   
 Still, the ouster of California’s Supreme Court justices took place a quarter-
century ago.  And we’ve not often seen judges ousted for high-profile decisions on 
divisive social issues in the years since then.  Occasionally, as I have mentioned, 
justices of state high courts have been ousted but it has not been a frequent 
occurrence.  So you may wonder whether this is something we really need to worry 
about.  I think we do.   
D.  Megatrends 
The reason we should worry about Iowa has to do with two megatrends: the 
polarization and monetization of American politics.  While these megatrends are 
related to many aspects of our political system—including who can compete for 
office, how districts are drawn, how campaigns get funded, and how legislation gets 
passed—I’m going to focus on their impact on judicial elections in particular.   
Let me start with polarization.  They say a picture is worth a thousand words, and 
here’s a political cartoon to prove it.  The elephant is saying “I am Right and You 
Lie!”  as the donkey (a symbol going back to the Jacksonian era) says “No. I’m 
Right and You Lie!”  
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 This image nicely captures something many Americans, think is wrong with 
contemporary politics.  The parties have little interest and, it would seem, relatively 
little incentive to compromise.  We live in an age of hyper-polarization, with 
approval of Congress at historically low levels.  Well sure, you might say, we think 
our politics is polarized now, but don’t people in every age think the same thing?  It 
turns out we really are living in a hyper-polarized era.  The best law review article on 
the subject is Rick Pildes’ “Why The Center Does Not Hold,”150 which documents 
the problem in meticulous detail and attempts to explain it.  Professor Pildes 
concludes that we really are living in an era of “extreme political polarization,” not 
seen since the late 19th Century, around the time of the Civil War.  One commentator 
has put it this way:  “Republicans and Democrats now line up against each other 
with regimented precision like soldiers going into battle.”151   
But it’s not just politicians who are polarized.  As Professor Pildes also 
documents, voters too increasingly line up in ideologically consistent ways.152  What 
I mean by “ideologically consistent” is that if I know where you stand on abortion, I 
can predict where you stand on taxes.  If I know where you stand on gay marriage, I 
can predict where you stand on environmental regulation.  There are, of course, 
always some people who have a liberal position on one issue and a conservative 
position on another.  But across a range of issues, those who study public opinion 
find that people are increasingly lining up in very predicable ways.  This is true even 
of nominally independent voters; those who pay attention to politics and regularly 
vote tend to align with one party or another.  Split ticket voting has declined sharply 
in recent decades.  Some people do fall in the middle of the political spectrum, but 
they tend to be nonvoters or occasional voters who are less attentive to politics—and 
less likely to vote.   
What are the causes of extreme polarization in our politics these days?  There’s 
no definitive answer to this question, though Professor Pildes identifies several 
possible causes.  Those explanations include polarizing personalities like Bill 
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama; primary elections that are 
increasingly dominated by the liberal or conservative base, giving candidates little 
incentive to tack toward the center; polarization of the news media (think of Fox v. 
MSNBC replacing Walter Cronkite); and gerrymandered districts, which makes 
incumbent legislators more worried about challenges from the extreme of their own 
parties party (from the right for Republicans, the left for Democrats), than a more 
moderate challenger from the other party; and the ideological “purification” of the 
parties that followed Voting Rights Act, which caused conservative Southern 
Democrats to switch parties and may ultimately have led to the extinction of liberal 
and moderate Republicans.    
I won’t dwell on these possible explanations because, for present purposes, the 
causes of political polarization are less important than the effects.  At the national 
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level, gridlock is the most obvious effect.  Nowadays, with the increased use of the 
filibuster to block any legislation with which one party disagrees, it takes a 
supermajority of sixty in the Senate to get anything significant done.  And when 
there’s divided government, as has been the case for the past several years, there has 
to be agreement across the aisle for a bill to become law.  The willingness to 
compromise, most glaringly evident in the recent debt ceiling impasse, has been one 
casualty of the hyper-polarization of our politics.  The end result is a breakdown in 
governance, especially in circumstances of divided government.  The bitterness and 
recrimination that surrounds our political process now threatens to spill over into 
judicial elections—indeed, it already has.   Polarization is part of the explanation for 
what happened in Iowa and what could happen more and more often around the 
country.   
The second megatrend is big money politics.  This is something that has been 
going on for decades, but has received increasing attention—and deservedly so—in 
the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission153 two years ago.  We have seen in recent decades, a steep 
increase in the amount of money that is being spent in politics generally. 
Both total contributions to and spending by presidential candidate  have 
increased exponentially since 1976.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar dynamic has occurred in congressional races.  The average U.S. House 
winner spent $1.4 million in 2010 and the average winner in the U.S. Senate almost 
$10 million.  There is also a lot of outside money coming into these races, around 
half a million dollars for the average House race and almost $2 million for the 
average Senate race.  In 2010, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $32 million, the 
American Action Network spent $26 million, American Crossroads spent $21.5 
million, and Crossroads GPS spent $17 million.  That’s a lot of money being spent 
by outside groups trying to influence elections.  As a matter of current U.S. 
constitutional law, starting with Buckley v. Valeo and proceeding through Citizens 
United, such independent campaign expenditures by individuals and corporations 
cannot be limited.  We had an enormous influx of money from Super PAC’s and 
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nonprofits in the last election cycle, which is sure to continue with a vengeance in 
the current election cycle and for the foreseeable future.    
Although judicial elections have been something of a laggard, in terms of the 
amount of money that’s spent influencing the outcome, the cost of becoming an 
elected judge has increased.  As late as the 1960s, it was said that judicial elections 
were about “as exciting as a game of checkers . . . [p]layed by mail.”154  That has 
certainly changed.  In the words of one commentator, judicial campaigns have 
become “‘nastier, nosier, and costlier.’” 155  Spending doubled between 1990 and 
2004.  One recent study found that, since 1993, winners in state supreme court races 
raised $91 million compared to $53 million raised by losers.156  Another found that 
“judicial candidates for state high courts between 1999 and 2006 raised over $157 
million, more than twice the amount raised by candidates in the four election cycles 
prior combined.”157  The increased competitiveness of judicial elections has led to 
changes in how campaigns are conducted, including an added pressure to raise more 
funds.158 
E.  Effects 
Why is this a bad thing?  A great quotation from a member of Ohio’s state 
supreme court encapsulates the problem: “‘I never felt so much like a hooker down 
by the bus station . . . as I did in a judicial race. . . . Everyone interested in 
contributing has very specific interests. . . . They mean to be buying a vote.’”159  Of 
course, this is just one state judge’s perspective, but there’s evidence to back up his 
subjective perception.  The problem can be broken down into three parts:  (1) the 
effect on campaigns and election results; (2) the effect on judicial decisionmaking; 
and (3) the effect on the legitimacy of state courts.  
Contemporary judicial campaigns more closely resemble campaigns for other 
elected offices than used to be the case.  Candidates solicit contributions, use attack 
ads, and make promises about what they’ll do if elected.160  It’s hard to deny that 
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money makes a difference in campaigns, allowing candidates to publicize their 
candidacies.161 What’s less clear is how much the ability to raise money affects who 
can become or remain a state judge.  Candidates certainly chase campaign money 
because they know, or at least think, it makes a difference.  If you can’t raise money, 
you can’t expect to compete—and you’ll probably choose not to run and perhaps not 
to seek retention.  While it’s difficult to pinpoint the precise effect of money on 
election results, it appears to be more important for challengers than for 
incumbents.162  This is probably because judicial candidates lacking name 
recognition depend more on advertising.163  There’s also some evidence, albeit 
indirect, that money from wealthy business interests helps.  From 2000 to 2004, 
“voters elected 36 of 40 judges supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,” 
which spent about $100 million over this period of time.164  
Even more worrisome than the impact on election results is the effect on judicial 
decisionmaking.  Campaign contributors often appeared in court before judges to 
whom they contributed.165  Judges may favor those who have supported their 
campaigns, or whom they hope will do so in the future.  Even if the particular 
litigant before them hasn’t spent money on their campaign, appellate judges may be 
aware that the law they make will affect potential donors or spenders.  This problem 
is equally severe for judges who face retention elections as it is for those who face a 
contested re-election campaign.  Just how much does money affect judicial 
decisionmaking?  It’s hard to draw definitive conclusions from the empirical 
research,166 but the best recent evidence provides convincing evidence that some 
judges do in fact adjust their decisions to attract votes and campaign money.167  
Professors Kang and Shepherd recently examined a dataset that included decisions 
by over four hundred state supreme court judges in more than twenty-one thousand 
cases over a four-year period.168  They focused on the contributions from business 
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groups, which accounted “for almost half of all donations to judicial campaigns.”169  
Judges who received campaign contributions from business groups were more likely 
to decide cases in favor of business interests.170  They even made a rough attempt to 
quantify the relationship between money and decisionmaking, finding that a $1,000 
contribution increased the average probability that a judge would vote for a business 
litigant by 0.03%, while a $1,000,000 contribution increased that probability by 
30%.171 
The third way in which money affects the judiciary is legitimacy.  Should we 
trust a system in which judges depend on money from the very interests if not the 
very parties who are affected by their decisions?  Many people think not, and with 
good reason.  Seventy-six percent of voters think that campaign contributions affect 
judges’ decisions.  The number is even higher here in the state of Ohio.  Even judges 
themselves agree.  While few judges would admit that they are biased, many do 
express concerns about the impact that campaign money has on judicial 
decisionmaking generally.  A 2001 survey found that 50% agreed that campaign 
donations influenced courtroom decisions by some judges.172  Most state judges 
believed that the tone and conduct of judicial campaigns had gotten worse over the 
past five years, and most elected high court justices cited immense pressure to raise 
campaign money during their election years.173  There is a conflict of interest 
between the judicial obligation to interpret and apply the law impartially, and their 
personal interest in seeking reelection or retention—an interest that, as a practical 
matter, requires them to take money from people and entities with a stake in their 
decisions.  Such a system presents serious legitimacy concerns.174 
F.  Conclusion 
What can be done?  This is a very difficult problem, and there are no easy 
answers.  One possible solution is to require recusal of judges with conflicts.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court required recusal a couple of years ago in the case of Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,175 but only because the conflict was so egregious.  This 
ruling won’t solve the broader problems of money affecting who becomes or 
remains a judge, the decisions they make as judges, and ultimate the legitimacy of 
state’s judicial systems.  Another possibility is to provide better information for 
voters.  There may be room for improvement at the margins, but it doesn’t seem 
terribly likely that ordinary citizens will pay more attention to judicial elections than 
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they currently do.  And even if they do, it doesn’t solve the independence problem—
and might even exacerbate it, enhancing the prospect of judges being punished for 
ruling in favor of criminal defendants, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, or 
other unpopular groups.  We could impose stricter limitations on campaign 
contributions and enhance disclosure rules.  As a matter of First Amendment law, 
however, you can’t limit independent expenditures by outside groups, including 
those funded with corporate money.  We could try to raise the floor rather than 
lowering the ceiling through public funding for judicial elections.  But in another 
recent decision, Arizona Free Enterprise Club Freedom Club PAC v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Supreme Court has severely hampered those efforts by 
preventing public funding from being targeted to those contests in which it’s needed 
most.  Finally, we could have life tenure for state judges, eliminating elections 
entirely, but this is likely to run into fierce public opposition.  A possible fallback 
position is a fixed term of years with no possibility of reappointment.  That would 
fix the real problem, the incentive for judges to cater either to an angry electorate or 
well-financed interest groups.   
Iowa’s 2010 election was a sad event, not only for gay and lesbian rights but also 
for those who care about judicial independence.  But like any good crisis, Iowa 
presents us with a great opportunity to change things for the better.  My personal 
preference would be for states to get rid of judicial elections altogether and move to 
the federal model, which offers much greater insulation from money and 
partisanship.  It is not my purpose, however, to prescribe any particular solution.  
Movement to the federal model is not likely to be realistic in most places.  And the 
best politically feasible solution will likely vary from state to state.  What I do insist 
on is the idea that, as lawyers, we have a special obligation to call attention to the 
importance of judicial independence and the threat that exists from our current 
system of judicial elections.  I commend Chief Justice Ternus for using her personal 
experience to call attention to this critical issue, and hope that all of you will be 
moved to action by this experience.   
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